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Abstract
Since settlement first began, equality issues between different social classes have
been evident in the location of where residents settled in New Orleans.

This research

seeks to answer the question: What socioeconomic indicators are prevalent in the areas
most-at-risk to flooding which could inhabit populations least able to evacuate?
I will use Census 2000 block group data from the socioeconomic sample data
(SF3) collected in 2000, along with other economic and GIS data from the New Orleans
region to statistically represent the distribution of risk by selecting indicators predicted to
be in flood zones from a classification tree analysis. Then, the results are shown in a
spatial manner to identify the location of the most vulnerable people to a hurricane based
on a set of indicators. The ADvanced CIRCulation Model (ADCIRC) hurricane storm
surge modeling (1) Hurricane Pam and (2) Hurricane Pam—85 percent strength, two
hurricane disaster exercises, hurricane probability estimates, and resampled LIDAR
elevation data will be used as the base maps to characterize the areas that will flood first
during a hurricane. The overlaying of the physical and social layers will identify the
most socioeconomically vulnerable people in the first-to-flood areas to show where
evacuation planning is essential. Recommendations for successfully evacuating residents
are then discussed.

vi

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Nature of Flood Hazard
Because the United States strives to function on a “freedom platform,” every citizen
has the right to a safe, habitable place. Although many locations in this country are
beginning to prove otherwise, it is advantageous to know the hazards facing certain
communities in order to not only minimize disaster costs to the citizens, their property, and
economic vitality for the region, but also estimate those costs to society for budgeting and
planning purposes. Often, the same socioeconomic indicators can be used to estimate the
vulnerability of populations to other disasters (Boyd et al., 2005).
The Worldwatch Institute determined that half of all deaths from natural disasters
were due to floods (Abramotivz, 2001). Floods are the nation’s most frequent and costly
natural hazard—in terms of deaths, infrastructure damage, property damage, and
agriculture and wildlife damage (Mileti, 1999). The amount of damage to the respective
entities has failed to decline substantially while injuries and deaths from tropical storms
have grown (Mileti, 1999). Flooding is the most common and the most devastating natural
hazard in South Louisiana, as well as the most common natural hazard nationally and
globally (World Meteorological Organization, 2004). Of Louisiana’s major 54 Disaster
and Emergency Declarations, 43 were due to flooding, 18 were from hurricanes or tropical
storms (FEMA Region IV Disaster History, 2006).
1.2 Hurricane History in New Orleans
The City of New Orleans was built upon the dependence of artificial levees to
ensure safety and sustenance from hurricanes and flooding to the citizens, but the levees did
not always demonstrate flood protection. Fourteen major hurricanes have made landfall in
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Louisiana in the past century, averaging one major hurricane per decade (National Oceanic
Atmospheric Administration, 2002). Six out of the past fourteen hurricanes have grazed
New Orleans or a nearby parish causing significant damage, (1915: unnamed Category 4
and 1969: Camille, Category 5) or pummeled close enough to overtop the levees and flood
the city (unnamed 1947--Category 4; Flossy, 1956—Category 1; Betsy, 1965--Category 3;
Hilda, 1964—Category 4; Katrina, 2005--Category 4; Rita, 2005--Category 3) (National
Weather Service Forecast Office, 2003).
Hurricane destruction to New Orleans has been recorded as early as 1722 (Wilson,
1973), but only hurricanes affecting New Orleans in the twentieth and twenty-first century
are mentioned here. In 1915, a Category 4 hurricane passed 20 miles east of New Orleans,
similar to Hurricane Katrina’s 35 miles east of New Orleans. Two hundred-seventy nine
people were killed; over 25,000 New Orleans buildings suffered structural damage (Wilson,
1973). In September of 1947, the lakefront seawalls were topped by hurricane storm surge
waves, inundating over 30 square miles of Jefferson Parish, and nine square miles in
Orleans (Colten, 2005). Hurricane Flossy (Category 1) breached the lakefront levees in
1956, again inundating a large area of the Gentilly neighborhood, and along the Industrial
Canal (Ibid). In 1964, Hurricane Hilda (Category 4) also exposed the levee weakness by
flooding businesses along the Industrial Canal (Ibid).
Hurricane Betsy, described by the Army Corps of Engineers as the “most
destructive hurricane on record to strike the LA coast” (USACE, 1965) made landfall at
9pm on September 9, 1965. The eye crossed west of Grand Isle, with wind velocities
recorded at 70-105 mph, and gusts of over 160 mph. Tides measured 16 feet above mean
sea level; the minimum pressure was 28.00 degrees.
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Betsy also had the “greatest tidal surge ever recorded on the MS River and over vast
coastal areas of southeastern LA” (USACE, 1965). Eighty-one (81) Louisianaians were
killed; 17,600 were injured.

Betsy was one of the fastest moving Gulf of Mexico

hurricanes on record—the hurricane warning time was less than 12 hours and thus made
evacuation even more strenuous (Ibid). Two hundred fifty thousand people evacuated—
noted as “one of the largest evacuations of danger areas accomplished in the continental
United States” (Ibid). Ninety percent “90% of the 627,500 people in the southeastern LA
coastal area (250,000 persons) evacuated and moved to safe shelters on high ground”
(Ibid). Betsy's center passed 35 miles southwest of New Orleans around midnight blowing
winds 100+mph, overtopping and breaching levees, and flooding 44% of the land.
“Inundation in the most highly developed parts of Orleans parish occurred in the areas to
the west and east of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal near MRGO (formerly the
Industrial Canal), the Citrus area, the N.O. east area, lower New Orleans, and w/in the
levees of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal” (Ibid). Inundation was as high as eight feet
in lower New Orleans with over 8,100 homes inundated causing $38,403,000 of damages to
homes (Ibid).
Hurricane Camille’s (1969) Category 5 waves scoured a section of the Industrial
Canal’s base and again inundated residential areas, with more severe flooding in New
Orleans East in the Venetian Isles subdivision (Colten, 2005).
The Crescent City also battled flooding in the spring of 1927, where “thousands fled
their homes, hundreds died, and crops drowned in the fields” after the upstream levees
broke (Colten, 2005). In May 1978, another huge flood that dumped more than nine inches
of rain totaled a $71 million loss with 71,500 homes damaged (Colten, 2005). In May of
1995, a record flood event of 12 inches of rain in six hours caused Congress to authorize
3

the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project after seven lives were lost and 35,000
homes were flooded (USACE, 2005). The last significant flood event was in 2002, when
Tropical Storm Isidore inundated I-10 with 23 inches in eight hours, closing it down for
more than twenty-four hours (Colten, 2005).
1.3 Hurricane-induced Metropolis Failures
Severe flooding from a tropical storm or hurricane has proven to be detrimental to
the City of New Orleans in terms of fatalities, infrastructure damage, and economic
disruption. Table 1.1 below describes the related failures that could result from a tropical
Table 1.1 Hurricane/Tropical Storm Related Failures
Hurricane/Tropical Storm Related Failures
1.

Human alterations to the natural environment not sustainable with existing natural
features

2.

Levee limitations for safety and long-term viability

3.

Mechanical drainage pump maintenance limitations

4.

Historical racial inequities in urban design (sewage, drainage)

5.

Lack of evacuation resources

6.

Shelters within the city are not feasible due to safety reasons for flooding

storm or hurricane striking near New Orleans. Human modifications have not been in
balance with nature’s existing system, therefore minimizing hurricane protection to the
coastal communities.

The cypress swamps north of Metairie and Gentilly ridges were

drained and filled for development, which offset water runoff moving away from the city.
The levee system starved the already subsiding land of nutrients and sediments from the
levee system. Oil and gas canals fragmented the wetlands, therefore hastening coastal
4

erosion. Structural development has not factored in sea level rise from global warming.
Levees have limitations regarding their minimal reliability and rising costs. The
levees were overtopped and breached numerous times over the past 200 years as discussed
earlier in detail. The cost of maintaining the levees will accrue as the ground under them
subsides and sea level rises, as well as when energy will equate to higher construction
costs.
The mechanical pumps have limitations, fair reliability, and rising costs. The
geographic nature of the city does not allow for natural drainage, therefore, all runoff from
the City is artificially pumped into the surrounding lakes. Figure 1.1 highlights the New
Orleans Sewage and Drainage Board pumps. “Almost 200 miles of canals leading to 22
pumping stations are located in the low points of the city. The stations are only able to
pump 35 billion gallons of water per day from the city into the surrounding lakes, [equating
to about one inch per hour] filling the capacity of the Superdome in 35 minutes”
(Westerink, 2003). Following hurricane Betsy, only six dredges were operated in the
vicinity of New Orleans to relieve the flooding from Betsy. More pumps were then
installed in the flooded area, with the largest at the Citrus Canal in New Orleans. After
Katrina, the Corps began publishing weekly operations reports on September 16, after the
city was dredged and drained, and New Orleans is not mentioned on its operations list,
although it is known that they dredged (USACE, 2005b).
Since settlement first began, equality issues between different social classes based
on where in New Orleans they lived have been proven evident by some researchers,
including Colten, but not with recent data. The wealthy, elite class settled on the natural
levee made by the Mississippi River; conversely, the poor immigrants and slaves settled in
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Figure 1.1 New Orleans Sewage and Drainage Pumps
Source: New Orleans Sewage and Drainage Board
the lowest elevations that were prone to periodic flooding (Colten, 2005). Although this
equality/location issue in New Orleans has been stated (Colten, 2005), it has not been
spatially proven that lower elevations correlate to a higher physical and social vulnerability
index to be described later. There is a history of racial inequities and Jim Crow tendencies
with drainage, sewerage, and water delivery systems (Colten, 2005). The first signs of this
inequity are evident in Jackson Square, the prominent European American social space,
which is located about 10 feet higher than Congo Square, an African American market and
social gathering place which deteriorated by the 1890s (Ibid). After drainage systems
improved in the City, the malaria death rate dropped from 104:100,000 to 8:100,000 in the
6

period between 1900 and 1912, but the black population’s death rate was much higher from
malaria and typhoid than the white population death rate, suggesting a disparity between
the sanitary services of the two races (Ibid). The highly efficient pumps, which were
installed as part of the Progressive Era engineering project, are “identified as the agent for
racial segregation in New Orleans” (Ibid).
Warnings and evacuation of the population need time and resources. Hurricanes do
not always position themselves to hit in a timely and consistent manner, as was witnessed
during the path of Hurricane Katrina.
Shelters inside New Orleans are not feasible due to the low elevation and
mechanical draining. In the U.S. House of Representatives final report, “A Failure of
Initiative,” “at these locations, they were subjected to unbearable conditions: limited light,
air, and sewage facilities in the Superdome, the blistering heat of the sun, and in many
cases limited food and water” (2005).
1.4 Short-Term and Long-Term Strategies
Communities can collectively begin to prepare (in different timescales) for shortterm and long-term mitigation for the hazards that lie in their area (see Table 1.2).

The

short-term objectives include (1) adopting International Building Codes and other passiveliving techniques which enable residents to survive in their homes without power and water
lines for longer periods of time; (2) installing a system which rings home phones
automatically to sound an alarm that a disaster is nearing; (3) having (or requiring)
developers to weight worst-case losses more than they currently do (levee durability was to
stand in a 200-year storm; Netherlands levee systems stands for a 10,000-year storm); (4)
educating citizens through schools and jobs of the acknowledgment of (a) the lack of
perception of probability of loss, (b) the false assumption that some citizens have of the
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event never reoccurring, (c) the dissonance theory, (d) fatalistic thinking, as well as (e)
what to prepare to bring when evacuating; (5) enacting laws requiring real estate agents to
inform their clients of hazards when selling property and structures; (6) making low
resolution NRV hazard maps available to the public (especially renters) by diverse
dissemination pathways (internet, mail, newspaper, flyers). The education exercises could
be too technical for the ordinary citizen, but simple cartoon strips could do the job.

Table 1.2 Short and Long-Term Strategies
Short-term objectives
1.

Local governments should adopt 2003 International Building Code and International
Energy Efficiency standards, which will include 100 or 500 year base flood heights
for buildings, and the State should adequately enforce them

2.

Automatically ringing phones during an evacuation

3.

Developers need to weight worst-case losses more in design permits

4.

Educate citizens of risk perception and probability of loss, and preparation

5.

Real estate agents required to inform potential buyers of property in a hazard zone, as
defined by state and local government

6.

Make risk value hazard maps available to public by public display
Long-term objectives

1.

Improved probability estimates as related to constant changing environment

2.

Higher resolution hazard maps provided by state and local governments

3.

Use of market-based incentives for building physical capital and infrastructure in
hazard free zones
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(continued)

4.
5.

Minimizing the social vulnerabilities by increasing wages for those people earning
under $25,000 so that they can support themselves
Build stronger levees in areas chosen to include human development, and use other
land as wetlands to absorb the surge
Long-term objectives include (1) improved probability estimates as factors such as

global warming and changing landscapes are influenced, (2) higher resolution hazard maps,
and (3) the encouragement for building physical capital and infrastructure in hazard free
zones with market-based incentives. When a disaster does occur, and relocation is the only
option for whatever reason, the evacuees will migrate towards naturally safer areas over
time.

Service industry jobs, such as tourism, internet-based businesses, and outdoor

recreation could dominate the hazard zoned areas, while manufacturing and agriculture, and
other brick-and-mortar headquarters could occupy the evacuee zoned areas.

(4)

Minimizing the social vulnerabilities by increasing wages for those people earning under
$25,000 so that they can support themselves and be less dependent on the government for
assistance. Lastly, (5) stronger levees are indispensable for areas chosen to include human
development. Reverting areas which flood frequently back to wetlands could absorb more
storm surge for the populated regions and provide additional protection to the levees.
A hurricane awareness/preparedness campaign was conducted by the Virginia
Department of Emergency Management for the Tidewater area using Hazard Mitigation
Grant Planning (HMGP) funds. These funds produced a brochure titled “Hurricane:
Evacuate or Stay?” The brochure gives citizens advice about tracking official hurricane
updates and official evacuation advisories and for developing a family preparedness plan.
It also provides helpful advice on emergency supplies and items that should be part of a
family go-kit, the need for cash, gasoline, and how to handle pets in emergencies. Other
initiatives taken include the National Sheriffs’ Association which incorporated disaster
9

preparedness materials into the National Neighborhood Watch program and worked with
the National Emergency Management Association to create emergency planning guidelines
for utilities and businesses. However, these efforts tend to be episodic at best and have had
limited impact in terms of the total number of professionals contacted; have failed to be
multi-hazard in focus; have not fully addressed land use mitigation alternatives; and have
reached just a few of the professional groups that could influence local land use decision
making (Paterson, 1998).
Currently, there is a lack of political will to manage land use because there are
hindrances and dinincentives inherent in state and federal policies, among other issues
(Mileti, 1999). Public policy has not progressed in enforcing uniform building codes
because the inspection staff size does not meet the volume of recipients, the staff is not
well-trained, or they are bribed to overlook some aspects of construction (Parker, 1994).
Will these recent disasters help citizens and governments reprioritize issues that are
important to them? If so, then we can resolve many social, natural, and building issues at
once by building more disaster resilient communities; which means re-wiring all
communities (whether they are in a disaster zone or evacuation zone) to operate more
cooperatively and efficiently which will provide more leverage for the victims and our
government. Why make the re-wiring a collective effort between citizens, private, public,
and governmental agencies to absorb the sensitivity of our implications of civilization?

In

order to comprehend the changing environments, it is necessary to understand the
fundamentals of how the key stakeholders--citizens, private, public, and governments--can
work together to achieve resiliency in their environment. Gori’s analysis (1991) of the U.S.
Geological Survey capacity-building experiment, involving the placement of geologists at
the local level, shows that scientific professionals can be effective in influencing local
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agendas, increasing awareness of hazards, and easing implementation of mitigation
measures (Paterson, 1998).

Dwight Brashear, CEO of CATS (Capital Area Transit

System), noted on L-NPR that before Katrina, Kansas City Southern Railroad (KCS) would
not allow Amtrak to utilize their railroads from Baton Rouge to New Orleans for public
transportation (2005). Since the hurricane, KCS and Amtrak are cooperating with DOTD,
L-DOTD, and CATS to establish public rail transportation in the near future for the region.
1.5 Costs of Maintaining Safety vs. Benefits of Living in the Area
When examining the costs (economic, environmental, social), the benefits to be
received should outweigh those costs in order for an effective outcome to be achieved.
Would the additional social benefit provided by one of the services listed above (levees,
wetlands, government assistance) exceed the additional social cost such as raising taxes or
reallocating taxes to build more levees? As there is finite amount of government spending,
where would be funding be reallocated from?--education, environmental protection,
fighting poverty, drugs, and violence?

Land use decisions, formed by economic and

institutional factors, is a function of the potential social and economic damage from
flooding (Lichtenberg, 1994).

An example of a factor, the decision to build a levee and

thus creating a false security which spurs development is a past decision that has evolved
into a moral hazard of known false security by the Army Corps of Engineers (Lichtenberg,
1994). Are the costs of rebuilding the levee less than the benefits of the increasing built
environment? A better idea to establish building codes as if the levee were not there would
achieve the goal of flood protection, which would equate the marginal social benefits of
expected damage reduction with its marginal social cost of the compliance of the newer
building codes.
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1.6 Problem Statement
This research seeks to answer the question: What is the relationship between low
socioeconomic status inside the simulated hurricane surge zones (not including possible
levee breaches as the strength of the levee is still unknown) as compared to those not
residing in those zones?
1.7 Research Purpose and Objectives
The objective of this paper is to compare areas of physical risk with social and
economic vulnerability factors in order to identify vulnerable populations at risk. It is
intended to demonstrate a method for identifying those most at risk who are in high hazard
areas (i.e., vulnerable), which is a combination of storm surge depth and socioeconomic
conditions. This study will follow the Federal Emergency Management Agency's planning
for natural hazard mitigation procedures. Past hurricanes, and modeled hurricanes' storm
surge outputs will provide the hazard profile and event (FEMA Natural Hazard Mitigation
Steps 1 and 2-Profile Hazard and Potential Event).

Socioeconomic variables are

characterized at the blockgroup level which shows dominant characteristics of populations
that could be affected by the hazard event (FEMA Mitigation Step 3—Characterize
Vulnerabilities). In this step, the physical and social information are brought together to
estimate the number of individuals and households most vulnerable in terms of the
expected losses from the hurricane hazard.
Public officials may find this method useful in identifying the most vulnerable
populations residing in a vulnerability zone. Disaster and evacuation events are included to
characterize the nature of what laws and policies are in place to respond to those
populations defined vulnerable. Recommendations and conclusions are then stated on how
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lawmakers, industry, and the general public can drive policy toward a more disaster
resilient state.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Vulnerability Characteristics
The Heinz panel recommended that the characteristics of the families affected by
hazards be considered when planning (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000). High-risk groups,
such as the lower income brackets, the elderly, the disabled, women living alone, femaleheaded households, families with low ratios of adults to dependents, ethnic minorities,
renters, recent residents, tourists, and the homeless make up the “social and economic costs
of disasters [which] fall unevenly on [these] different classes of victims and stakeholders”
(H. John Heinz III Center, 2000; Cutter et al., 2000; Bolin and Stanford, 1991; Blaikie et
al., 1987; Morrow 1999;). “Inequality of wealth…makes many people more vulnerable to
hazards and less able to recover from them” (Mileti, 1999).
Cutter et al.'s Handbook was chosen as the template for performing this
vulnerability assessment, although the scope and indicators were slightly modified. Cutter
et al's Handbook calls for data to be used at the block level describing age (less than 18;
over 65), gender (females), race, and income (mean household value) to be the primary
social vulnerability indicators (1997). Type of housing and where in the area people reside
was mentioned as other important indicators of risk (Ibid).
Other people choose not to leave and they are vulnerable to the risk. This intractable
populations' reasoning includes planning only for the immediate future, misjudging their
capacity to cope when disaster strikes, and depending on emergency relief, as was
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.5 (Mileti, 1999).
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2.2 Similar Studies and the Models Behind Them
2.2.1 Social and Environmental Identifiers
Hurricanes Georges and Floyd in 1998 and 1999, once the two largest evacuations
in history, prompted evacuations to become a leading emergency management issue.
Historically, management of evacuations was done by local emergency management
officials, with little input from transportation engineers. Social indicators emerged in the
social sciences during the 1960s and 1970s, and environmental indicators, such as the
Toxic Release Inventory (administered by the Environmental Protection Agency) were not
far behind, which coalesced into the 'quality of life' characteristics (Cutter, et al., 2003) that
we see today ranking 'best cities to live in'. Public health has managed to become a more
recent 'quality of life' factor, as seen in more city and town rankings like Men's Fitness'
study which used the amount of public park space, access to health care, air quality, and the
relatively small number of fast-food restaurants as indicators of fitness (Trust for America’s
Health, 2005).

The United Nations Development Program is using socioeconomic

indicators to measure the social and economic implications of (to the extent possible) the
economic and social implications of regional partnership for the people of the region
(UNDP, 2005).
2.2.2 Integrating Social Statistics and Physical Hazards
The integration of social statistics with physical hazards is still in its infant stages.
Only a few attempts have been made to involve physical hazards and social vulnerabilities
like Boyd et al constructed in their Coastal Risk Analysis. As of 2001, Richmond et al.
concluded “there exists no established methodology for determining the hazardous nature
of a coastline” (Richmond et al., 2001) and Cutter et al. reconfirmed that metric standards
do not exist to assess the vulnerability to environmental hazards (2003). Richmond et al.
15

quantified the effects of only physical hazards to the Hawaiian Islands by historical records
and a ranking scheme based on hazard dynamic and frequency to define an overall hazard
assessment to be used for coastal land use planning (Cutter et al., 2003).
Some sociologists and physical scientists have made links to study the populations
subjected to hurricanes. Among them, Pal et al. examined evacuation using the same
variables and tools as Cutter, but focused more on evacuation exit time rather than those
who could not evacuate (2003). Baass stated in 1981 that socioeconomic characteristics
must have homogeneous populations, and the number of households should be equal.
Various sociologists, such as Cutter et al., 2003; Morrow, 1999; Pulido, 2000; and Peacock,
2000; have written endless peer-reviewed journal articles characterizing vulnerable
populations to natural and technological hazards such as hurricanes. Six specific studies on
evacuation behavior will be discussed in detail: Wilmot and Wei, Beggs, Laska, The
Mississippi Evacuation Data Report, and two of Cutter’s studies, along with other
government data, will be covered in detail for an empirical set of indicators to be chosen for
physical and social vulnerabilities.
FEMA prioritizes vulnerability in the order of 1. Income distribution 2. Elderly
populations 3. Disabled populations 4. Children 5. Minority neighborhoods 6. Language
and cultural barriers. Although FEMA is general as to what populations are vulnerable to
what hazards, it is likely that vulnerable populations can be assumed as having similar
characteristics.
Wilmot and Wei actually tested a data set of past hurricane behavior from PBS&J to
estimate as one method for having the ability to reproduce observed evacuation decisions
from Hurricane Andrew (Wilmot and Wei 2004).

The behavior was based on the

participation rate in response to flooding potential of the home, type of housing, and
16

hurricane intensity (Ibid). Another method that Wilmot and Wei examined to match with
observed evacuation decisions was a logistic regression model, a disaggregate model
describing the likelihood that a household would evacuate based on a. the characteristics of
the household, b. the location of the home with respect to the closest body of water, and c.
whether an evacuation order was issued or not. They concluded the five variables found to
be the most influential in determining evacuation demand were: dwelling type, evacuation
orders, location with respect to water (flooding), age of the respondent, and marital status
(Ibid). E. Baker also found that the nature of evacuation orders, and the belief of their
home flooding were influential reasons for evacuating (1991).
Beggs' study's objective was to predict what percentage of the Orleans population
would not evacuate. Their method involved telephone surveying random numbers located
in the city, although the phone numbers were never geocoded for a spatial location.
Providing a geographic location greatly enhances the ability of the study to become
empirical. Their analysis used regressions with the goal of explaining the dependent
variable with the least amount of variables possible. They believe that framing approaches
are igniting the collective action spurred by a social catalyst (Hurlbert and Beggs findings
lecture 3-4-05) like the warnings on television and through word of mouth.
2.2.3 Hurricane Evacuation Behavior in Southeastern Louisiana: A Twelve Parish
Survey
The Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of New Orleans has conducted
a study to characterize citizen evacuation behavior in twelve coastal parishes in Louisiana.
The goal is to determine the decision to evacuate, obstacles to evacuation, and what sources
are utilized when a hurricane threatens their parish (Howell, 2005).

The results are

summarized from the survey into three areas of interest: Reasoning behind evacuating,
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socioeconomic status in relation to evacuation, and if the residents were successful in their
evacuation decision:
The primary reason found for Orleans residents not evacuating is that the person
believes their home is safe. Sixty-two (62%) percent of respondents believe they would be
safe in their home during a Category 3 storm. The surveyors believe the belief that one is
safe in their home in a Category 3 storm is the single best predictor of actual evacuation
behavior (Ibid). Reasoning for evacuating during Georges that were relied on “a lot” were
concerns about severity/category of storm, advice from friends or relatives, and concern
about the direction of the storm (Ibid). Television meteorologists 64%, family and friends
46%, and hurricane graphics 43% on television were the major sources answered as relied
“a lot” on when deciding to evacuate or not (Ibid). An overwhelming majority (84%) do
not regret their decision to stay and not evacuate because of the threat created by Hurricane
Georges (Ibid).
Income has a significant correlation with willing to evacuate or not. The survey
found that individuals earning more than $50,000 per year are more likely to say they will
evacuate, and actually did evacuate for Hurricane Georges in 1998 (Ibid). “Thirty-six
(36%) percent of respondents said they actually evacuated during Georges. This is a
significant decline from the 70% who would evacuate hypothetically” (Ibid). The decline
could have come from increased awareness from public officials at the local, state, and
federal levels. Individuals over sixty-five, as well as African Americans, were less likely to
have evacuated for Georges (Ibid). Fourteen (14%) percent of the households sampled did
not have a vehicle (Ibid). Respondents without automobiles are less likely to say they
would evacuate and are less likely to have actually evacuated for Hurricane Georges.
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Thirty-two (32%) percent of evacuees did not go to a safer place during Georges;
they stayed in either Orleans or Jefferson Parish (Ibid). When asked hypothetically where
they would evacuate to, twenty-six (26%) percent of the Orleans individuals would stay in
Orleans or Jefferson Parish (Ibid). The second highest percentage, twenty-two (22%)
percent of individuals would go to places other than Mississippi, North Louisiana, or Texas
(Ibid). I find this statistic that people would evacuate further than one state away to be
unusually high because hurricane preparation is on whimsical notice. Black citizens were
less likely to retreat to a safer place than white citizens.

Forty (40%) percent of

respondents do not have a definite plan; twelve (12%) percent don’t have a very definite
plan. Those that do not have a plan are less likely to evacuate. Also, younger people (2034) and older people (65 and above) are less likely to have a plan (Ibid).
2.2.4 Mississippi Evacuation Data Report
The Mississippi Evacuation Data Report actually used some of UNO’s survey
results from Hurricane Georges to complete their analysis. The results are, therefore,
briefly stated in Table 2.1
Table 2.1 The Mississippi Evacuation Data Report states the results
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mobile home residents were much more likely to leave than other respondents were (81
percent versus 39 percent overall).
People between the ages of 40 and 65 were less likely to evacuate
than people both younger and older.
People who had lived in the region 30 years are more were less likely
than others to evacuate.
People living alone were more likely than others to evacuate.
Renters were more likely than homeowners to leave.
Wealthier respondents were slightly less likely than others to evacuate.
Women were more likely than men to go.

Other variables from other surveys examined states:
•
Number of years lived in one's present home.
•
Presence of children in the home
•
Pet ownership
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(continued)

•
•

Race
Education
2.2.4a Sheltering
The shelter use in Hurricane Georges was substantially lower than in Hurricane

Camille, but its threat was less intense. Katrina shelters might have well exceeded Camille
since such massive destruction was evident.
2.2.4b Transportation
Eight (8%) percent of the non-evacuating households included someone who would
have required assistance in order to evacuate. More than half of those involved someone
with a special care need, rather than just needing transportation. A third of those needing
assistance said they would require help from an outside agency, rather than from within the
household or from a friend or relative.
2.2.5 Cutter et al. Study
Susan Cutter et al. has constructed perhaps the most comprehensive county-level
Social Vulnerability Index with socioeconomic and demographic data to compare social
vulnerability from one county with another.

It is widely agreed upon that social

vulnerability is influenced by a lack of information and knowledge, and technology; lack of
political representation, richer social networks, culture, infrastructure, and disabilities
(Cutter et al., 2003). Age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status are the most common
variables used to measure the concepts (Ibid). Other characteristics used as variables
include the special needs populations, the physically and mentally disabled, non-English
speaking, the homeless, and the tourists.

Cutter et al. not only contributes social

vulnerability to inequality, but place/location inequalities as well. Better conditions of the
built environment, and areas earning higher incomes do increase their resilience to hazards
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(Cutter et al, 2003). Risk interacts with mitigation to produce the hazard potential (Ibid).
Mitigating the hazard potential has to do with the social fabric of the region, as well as the
proximity, geographic, and infrastructure conditions. Cutter et al. are only examining the
social vulnerability part of hazard mitigation in this study (2003).
Instead of weighting their 11 highest factors, they viewed each factor as having an
equal contribution to the overall vulnerability. Cutter et al. asks 'What will determine those
weights?' and then states '…the relationship between the level of social vulnerability and
biophysical risk is the next endeavor to seek’ (Ibid). Both of these issues are addressed in
this thesis. Cutter et al.'s Handbook (1997) study focuses on the integration of physical
hazards with the effects that they deliver to a particular society (Kasperson et al., 1995;
Cutter et al., 2000).
Susan Cutter et al have published the most acclaimed study (referenced in H. John
Heinz III Center, 2000) that integrates the physical and social hazards to determine who is
most vulnerable.

The study is part of a Handbook prepared for the South Carolina

Emergency Preparedness Division in 1997 to provide a method for emergency managers to
follow in their counties.

Cutter et al.'s Handbook was chosen as the template for

performing the thesis of a vulnerability assessment, although the scope and indicators were
slightly modified. Cutter et al.'s Handbook calls for data to be used at the block level
describing age (less than 18; over 65), gender (females), race, and income (mean household
value) to be primary social vulnerability indicators. Type of housing and where in the area
people reside was mentioned as other important indicators of risk. They determined the
social vulnerability scores by dividing each variable in the block by the total number of that
same variable at the county level. This determines the percent level of the county in each
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block. To make the score relative to the other variables, the percentage was divided by the
maximum percentage of all the variables.
Next, the scores for each variable are added together for every blockgroup.
Table 2.2 Cutter et al Table Setup
Social Variable A

Social Variable B

No Car / Total
Households
Blkgrp 100/200
A

Social Variable C

Physical Variable A

Sum of Variables

Low Income Score/ Race Score/Total
Total Households
Population

Hurricane
Probability

Vulnerability Score

81/200

.175

600/800

A composite vulnerability score is the social vulnerability score multiplied by the hazard
vulnerability score (hurricane probability).
2.2.6 Vulnerability Models
Past disaster data organized through risk assessments can serve as inputs to models,
which simulate our surroundings. Models are used to explain these critical decisionmaking conditions that define society. The Oak Ridge Evacuation Modeling System is a
recent model which was designed to evaluate emergency evacuations by estimating
evacuation time and developing plans for traffic flows, different destinations, and evacuee
response rates (Mallikarjun, et al., 2005).
The United States Geological Survey has created a National Atlas Webmap
(nationalatlas.gov), which enables a person to click on a parish/county, and view the
number of incidents, property damage, crop damage, fatalities, and injuries that happened
from 1995-2000. The webmap has different themes (Climate, Environmental, Biological,
People, etc) that are further subdivided into more specific variables, such as the People
theme is subdivided into Crime, Economy, Energy Consumption, and Health categories.
The themes can be mapped using the provided dynamic map, or raw data can be
downloaded in shapefile format for viewing with a GIS. The National Atlas can even be
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embedded in a personal application. Limitations include the lack of census data to predict
future vulnerable populations, as well as an incomplete database of overall themes. The
next version of the National Atlas will be released through the Geospatial-One Stop, an egovernment initiative sponsored by the Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to enhance government efficiency and to improve citizen services with datasets and
mapping services (Geospatial One-Stop, 2005).
Boyd et al. assessed the vulnerability of the Mississippi Gulf Coast to coastal storms
for NOAA using an on-line GIS-based coastal risk atlas, and concluded the information is
insufficient to mitigate the effects of coastal hazards (2005). Reasons for insufficiency are
that the SLOSH storm surge model is not precise enough in flood values. One advantage of
Boyd et al.'s study is that “gateways are developed to data repositories and middleware
technology is used to provide data in a multitude of scenarios” in order for users to view the
information (Boyd et al., 2005). Using a dynamic database that can be queried from in
different ways is valuable when trying to find the most significant variables that lead to
vulnerability.
The Boyd et al. study ranked the risks, such as flood zones. FEMA Q3 vectors, a
digitized version of the FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) are used for the CRA. A
risk score of five (5) is assigned to areas within the 100-year flood zone and subject to
wave action, AE zone. All other areas within the 100-year flood zone are assigned a four
(4). Areas in the 500-year flood zone are scored a three (3). All other areas are assigned a
two (2). Detailed hydraulic analyses are not performed so no base flood elevations (BFEs)
or depths are shown within this zone (FEMA Flood Hazard Mapping, 2005c). Mandatory
flood insurance purchase requirements apply. Boyd et al. uses these social vulnerability
indicators:
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SOCIAL VULNERABILITY




Population of persons living in poverty.
Population of persons over the age of 65.
Number of households consisting of a maritally single homeowner who
has at least one child.
 Population of persons who do not have a high school diploma.
 Population of persons who do not speak English.
 Number of occupied housing units without a vehicle.
 Number of occupied housing units being rented.
 Number of households receiving public assistance income.
 Number of housing units built before 1970.
 Number of housing units considered as mobile homes.
Figure 2.1 Social Vulnerability
In the Coastal Risk Analysis, percentages were calculated for each societal factor, and then
divided into quartiles. A risk score was then assigned based on those percentages, although
it is not clear how the scores were assigned to the percentages.
The Boyd et al. study (2005) obtained their storm surge data from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE) Mobile District Office for their storm surge information.
USACE is currently using SLOSH, Sea Lake and Overland Surge from Hurricanes for their
storm surge predictions, but are testing ADCIRC, a more precise storm surge model,
concurrently (Westerink, 2003). SLOSH was created and is run by the National Hurricane
Center (NHC). USGS 30 meter resolution DEM data was used for the model runs, but
according to Brett Herr, an engineer with the Army Corps, the inundation maps used the
water surface layer from the USGS DEM, with resolutions of approximately .1 to .2 square
miles and overlaid them on a topography layer that was developed from the more precise
LIDAR DEM 5 meter resolution data (2005). The SLOSH model is generally accurate
within plus or minus 20 percent. The SLOSH model does not contain nearly as many
computational nodes as does ADCIRC, and its boundary is much smaller (Westerink,
2003).
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2.2.7 HURREVAC
FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers have also developed HURREVAC 2000, a
program that downloads hurricane advisory data provided by the NHC and features it in a
user-friendly graphical interface to help decide when and if an evacuation should be
ordered (FEMA/ACOE, 2000). The program operates with specific clearance time data
files and surge map files for each coastal county, but the model is only available to the
emergency management community.
2.2.8 Google Earth
Perhaps Google Earth has made the biggest leap toward integrating GIS into many
sectors of employment, as well as for recreational use for those unfamiliar to the area they
wish to observe. Google Earth combines satellite imagery, maps, and the Google Search
engine to bring the world’s geographic information before the user in a matter of seconds.
After Katrina, Google Earth hosted NOAA’s satellite imagery of the flooded
neighborhoods in the Gulf region. Google Earth has a Professional package which utilizes
analyzing capabilities that traditional GIS software possesses. Soon, all GIS could be
displayed through the dynamic pyramid environment that Google Earth has developed,
while the traditional GIS firms will be concentrating more on the geoprocessing and
analysis features that have not yet been developed inside the Google Earth software.
Utilizing a software as powerful in performance and ease of use as Google Earth will
rapidly expand the scope of calculating vulnerability.
2.3 Risk Assessment Databases and Limitations
A common critique of risk assessments is that “most disaster analysis is based on
shaky foundations. Institutional bias, political interests and technical insufficiencies make
disaster statistics unsatisfactory and unreliable . . . this contributes to preserve myths about
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the effects of disasters on the economy and society” (Albala-Bertrand, 1993).

If the

interests will pull together from a jointly created database when estimating losses, there will
be less uncertainty in the extrapolations. This does not mean to limit the number of
creative algorithms as inputs; just apply them to standardized data. Although rarely cited in
publications, HAZUS (Hazard United States) wind/earthquake/flood estimation software
was developed by FEMA to provide loss estimation for the built and social environments.
The library used is primarily from the 2000 Census, Dun & Bradstreet, & Department of
Energy. Other methods such as integrating multiple problems to solve with a united
solution could better represent interests and their resiliency. This out-of-the-box thinking
should replace the current paradigm of individualism with datasets and algorithms. Other
agencies building global databases include: the International Federation of Red Cross and
Crescent Societies’ annual World Disasters Report, and the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University Louvain in Belgium’s EMDAT Disaster Events Database

(H. John Heinz III Center, 2000). The EM-DAT Disaster

Events Database pulls from UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the US Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance, national governments, insurance companies and news
agencies. Although they are still inconsistent in definitions, certain disaster types, and
disaster effects (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000), these databases have a lead way to the
ongoing process of improving hazard models.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
3.1 Overview
This issue of concern is if there is a relationship between risk (the surge inundation
hazard zone), and selected socioeconomic variables. Those socioeconomic variables which
do have a positive relationship with surge inundation will describe the level of
socioeconomic vulnerability. The surge inundation variables describe two storm surge
model outputs from ADCIRC Software utilized by the Louisiana State University
Hurricane Center.

In order to determine the factors that are associated with risk,

socioeconomic variables were chosen from the 2000 Census. Table 5.2 lists the variables
and their corresponding field names for analysis.

Four hundred eighty-two (482)

blockgroups were evaluated using SPSS Version 12.0 to determine which of the variables
are significantly correlated with the surge inundation zone. The data was analyzed using ttests to show a variance of analysis test, a classification tree to illustrate the breakpoints of
the variables that are more likely to terminate to a floodzone, and binary logistic regression
to show which variables have a positive relationship with inundation..
The dependent variables used in the analyses were two similar ADCIRC storm
surge models which partially flooded Orleans parish. The outputs were obtained by Hassan
Mashriqui, a storm surge engineer at the Louisiana State University Center for Public
Health Impacts of Hurricanes (www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu).

The storm surge

boundaries are interpolated, delineated, and then intersected with the blockgroups to show
what blockgroups are in a flood zone and a nonflood zone for classification and regression.
The storm surge boundaries are then classified even further to model the relationship
between the shallow and deeper zones within the surge boundary for an analysis of
socioeconomic variance as the water gets deeper. The level of inundation was zoned into
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five categories: zone 0--no water; zone 1--0.5 to 0.9 feet of water; zone 2--1.0 to 1.9 feet of
water; zone 3--2.0 to 2.9 feet of water; and zone 4—over 3 feet of water. Hazus-MH, the
FEMA flood modeling software, uses damage curves which these categories are reflected
from (Hazus-MH, 2005). Each blockgroup only has one category of elevation.
The independent socioeconomic variables are from the Census 2000 Summary File
3 (SF3), which contains the sample data at the blockgroup level. A blockgroup is a group
of city blocks determined by the U.S. Census Bureau. The blockgroup level was chosen in
this study because more socioeconomic data is available at that level than at the block level.
The data are compiled from the questions asked of a sample of all people and housing units
(roughly 1 in every 6 households). Table 3.1 lists the variables used.
Table 3.1 Physical and Social Indicators that Characterize Vulnerability
Variable

Description

Physical
Low elevation

Weighted average elevation of blockgroup

High storm surge inundation depth

3 different scenarios were used to characterize the
amount of flooding from surge

High probability of Cat 3 or <

Number of Cat 3 storms within 150 m of New
Orleans in past 166 years

Social
Household income is less than $25,000
Rented households
No vehicle
Nonwhite
Disabled population

Disabled Elderly

Disabled children
Disabled young adult/adult minus employment

Occupied households earning less than $25,000 per
year
Occupied rented housing units
Households that do not have vehicles
Sum of black, asian, latino, and mixed races
Total number of disabled noninstitutionalized
individuals over age five minus employment
disabilities
Noninstitutionalized individuals which are age 65
and over and have a physical, mental, sensory, gooutside-home, or self-care disability
Noninstitutionalized children age 5-15 with a
physical, mental, sensory, or self-care disability
Young noninstitutionalized adults [age 16] to adults

(continued)
28

disabilities

No high school diploma
No phone
Homeowner moved in 1969 or earlier
Children with a single parent

Elderly
Households Over 4 persons

[age 64] with a physical, mental, sensory, go-outsidehome, self-care disability minus the employment
disability
Individuals over age 25 without a high school
diploma
Occupied households without a telephone
Homeowner moved in 1969 or earlier (heuristic
thinking)
Children under age 18 living with working single
parent, so the entire family is more vulnerable due to
more responsibility (work and children)
Individuals over 65 from TIGER Population
Universe
Households with more than 4 people

The socioeconomic variables will be placed into an index which will define social
and physical vulnerability for each blockgroup in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The physical
variables to be placed in the index include the mean inundation from the two storm surge
scenarios, plus the probability of a hurricane to strike within one hundred fifty (150) miles
of Orleans parish. The physical and social risks are multiplied together to define
vulnerability. The short-term strategy, evacuation, can be intensified in these areas that are
at more risk because of a combination of physical and social circumstances. Table 3.2
illustrates the methodology in a conceptual diagram.
3.2 Quantify the Physical Risk
In quantifying the risk, the geographic vulnerability to hurricanes is
characterized through two modeled storm surge outputs, weighted average elevation values,
and historical occurrences of hurricanes that represent the areas of magnitude, low
elevations, and probability. The storm surge models and elevation values are categorized
by depth values for zoning vulnerability. The hurricane probability is determined by the
number of Category 3 and higher hurricanes since 1850, the first year of official
documentation.
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Table 3.2 The vulnerability and hazard entities help to characterize the impact of the
disaster, which is graphically shown as a distribution of risk at the blockgroup level of
Orleans parish, Louisiana. The short-term strategy to reduce vulnerability is evacuation,
which is the focus of this thesis.

Vulnerability
Low
socioeconomic
status

Hazard

T test: Which socioeconomic variables
are different in the flood and nonflood
zones?
Analysis of variance (anova1): What is
the trend of the defined ‘different’ variable
as the inundation increases?
Classification Tree: What variables are
likely to predict flooded areas?
Vulnerability Index : Distribution of Risk

-Surge height
-Elevation
-Hurricane
probability
Short-term strategy:
Evacuation of
vulnerable population

Methodology
A. Data Preparation
1) Determine the weighted average elevation of the blockgroups with LIDAR
elevation data, and append it to the vulnerability index.
2) Subtract the storm surge values from the weighted elevation values to get an
inundation value for both outputs.
3) Intersect each inundation shapefile with the blockgroup shapefile, and append them
(PAM4HOUR; P85INUNDAT) to the vulnerability index. These fields are the
continuous surge inundation values to be used for categorizing the flood versus
nonflood, and flood inundation.
4) Divide each surge inundation field into either a flood or nonflood zone. Divide the
respective zones further into intervals, and label either a 0,1,2,3, or 4 to reflect the
water depth. Append the categorized inundation values to the vulnerability index.
These fields are to be used for the classification tree and the vulnerability index.
5) Calculate the probability of a Category 3 hurricane within 100 miles of New
Orleans. Add the probability constant to the sum of the physical risks to get total
physical risk in the vulnerability index.
6) Gather Orleans parish socioeconomic indicators from Census, and append to the
vulnerability index.
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7) Calculate the social rate for the vulnerability index by simply dividing the
socioeconomic indicator by the total universe for the respective blockgroup.
8) Divide the percentage by the maximum percentage of each variable to make the
variables relative to each other for the vulnerability index.
B. Data Analysis
9) Perform a T-test on the socioeconomic variables to detect any differences of means
between the flood and nonflood zones.
10) Perform an Anova1 analysis of variance on the categorized storm surge inundations.
11) Perform a classification tree analysis on the social indicators (independent variables
and the surge depth intervals (categorical dependent variables) to predict the most
likely variables to fall in the inundation zones as a whole The classification tree is
done for both Pam4hr and Pam85 surge models. “Cut points,” or the point that
separates the four zones of surge (or for a simpler approach, the floodzone from the
nonflood zone), are found and queried in the database for which blockgroups match
the cut point conditions.
12) Aggregate the physical and social risks for a vulnerability index of the blockgroups.
13) Compare the results of the vulnerability index to the storm surge inundations.
14) Compare the results of the classification tree query to the storm surge inundations.
3.2.1 ADCIRC Storm Surge Model Background
Like the Coastal Risk Atlas (CRA) that was developed by NOAA (Boyd et al.,
2005), this methodology is similar, but more refined by using a more precise storm surge
model, ADCIRC, and more Census demographic information to determine who is at risk.
The CRA uses SLOSH and less demographic information.

ADCIRC, ADvanced

CIRCulation Model for Oceanic, Coastal And Estuarine Waters, is developed with inputs
from conventional hydrostatic pressure and Boussinesq approximations to predict a more
accurate storm surge than SLOSH. ADCIRC uses a domain-unstructured grid that is highly
localized based on the geographic feature distinguishing open Gulf waters from land in and
around the continental shelf (Westerink, 2003). Nodes, or grids that serve as the base for
the ADCIRC model, are spaced every 25 km (15.5 mi) in the open ocean, but gradually
become more refined with the continental shelf and are spaced as close as 100m (330 ft) in
New Orleans (Westerink, 2003). The closer spacing allows the variations in the nodes to
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be defined, like topography, canals, and levees. Topographic features such as natural and
manmade dredged channels and canals, lakes, bays, wetlands, river banks, levees, and
raised roadways prove the difficulty in modeling such a “geometrically and
hydrodynamically complex region” (Ibid).
How valuable is the ADCIRC storm surge data that will be utilized in this thesis?
In the mid-1960s, Corps engineers used variations of Newton’s second law and wind
speeds developed by the U.S. Weather Bureau to predict a storm’s magnitude (Westerink,
2003). Storm surge was predicted by computing the water buildup on Lake Pontchartrain’s
south shore levees along with the storm surge values from the 1915 and 1947 hurricanes
that shattered New Orleans (Ibid). Although the efforts to create a factor of safety were
determined, it has not yet been tested by a hurricane. ADCIRC, or Advanced Circulation
Model for Coastal Ocean Hydrodynamics supercedes the Corps engineers’ onedimensional, methodology in that it predicts long-term periods of circulation along coastal
shelves, coasts, and estuaries in a two-dimensional, numerical model. The past decade of
research with ADCIRC has been funded by the Corps with the goal of improving its ability
to more accurately model hurricanes, particularly those close to New Orleans (Ibid).
ADCIRC is run on parallel processors to solve as many as one million geographic nodes, so
the processing time is about an hour to run calculations for a 24-hour life of the storm. The
storm surge models and weighted elevation values are categorized by inundation values for
zoning vulnerability.
3.2.2 Pam 4-hr Storm Surge Model
Hurricane Pam’s surge inundation (the fictitious hurricane exercise), field name,
PAM4HOURIN, was calculated using an output from ADCIRC that characterized a
Category 3 fast moving storm. The original ADCIRC output is a point shapefile that is
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generated from text data. The point shapefile is then interpolated to a grid file. The final
output left the city of New Orleans completely inundated, so a grid was made in the early
hours of the storm, approximately four hours after landfall to show a partial flooding
scenario. The grid was converted to a polygon via ArcInfo, GRID. The geoprocessing
wizard in ArcView was used to intersect the surge polygon with the census blockgroup
shapefile. In order to calculate the weighted storm surge average in each blockgroup, the
Calcacre script was run to calculate the area of the storm surge inside the blockgroup. The
area was then multiplied by the surge value. The dissolve function in the geoprocessing
wizard dissolved the intersected blockgroup file into the surge polygon. The blockgroup’s
area was recalculated, and a weighted average field was created to divide the recalculated
area by the area of the storm surge. The surge zone area was divided by the blockgroup
area and multiplied by 100 to get a percentage of storm surge inside the blockgroups.
Those blockgroups with more than 50% of their area inside the surge zone were added to
the weighted storm surge values. Forty-one blockgroups had more than 50%, but less than
100% of their area in a surge zone. A more accurate way to account for those partially
covered blockgroups is to subdivide the blockgroup according to its surge inundation.
Blockgroup 00710017032 is an excellent example of how important it would be to use this
method. PAM4HOURIN is the weighted average surge elevation subtracted from the
weighted ground elevation that derives the inundation level. Figure 3.1 explains the
interpolation process. Figure 3.2 shows the Pam4hr surge inundation classes.
3.2.3 Pam85 Surge
Since it was available, another hurricane storm surge scenario, Pam85%, was used
to compare the regression and classification analysis results. Inundation depth, Pam85%,
field name, P85INUNDAT, was calculated using an output from ADCIRC that
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Figure 3.1 Surge Inundation Steps
characterized 85% of the intensity that the first Hurricane Pam model Category 3.
P85INUNDAT is the weighted average surge elevation subtracted from the weighted
ground elevation that derives the inundation level. The Pam85% point shapefile was a
much larger area than I needed, so I scaled it down by selecting points within 1000 meters
of the blockgroup shapefile. Those points were interpolated into a GRID with the cell size
of 100 meters since the elevations are at 100-meter resolution. The areas less than 100
shapefile’s surge values, and converted to a grid, and then to a coverage called surgpoly.
That coverage was then converted to a shapefile, and the grid-code was divided by 10 to get
the surge value. The final shapefile was intersected with the blockgroups; calcacre script
was run to calculate the area of the surge. The area of the surge was multiplied by the surge
value. The intersected file was dissolved with the surge polygon via geoprocessing wizard
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by the field ‘surge*surge_area’. The blockgroup’s area was recalculated from the dissolved
shapefile, and a weighted average field was created to divide the recalculated area by the
area of the storm surge. Figure 3.3 shows the Pam85 storm surge inundations.
3.3 Categorizing and Scoring Surge/Inundation Outputs
After the elevation was subtracted from the surge, the average depth of water per
blockgroup was categorized into four classes: 1= 0.5 – 0.9 feet; 2= 1 – 1.9 feet; 3= 2-- 2.9
feet; 4= 3 feet and above. Table 3.2 illustrates the scoring chart. The surge inundations are
categorized in order to see if correlation and regression are cleaner with categorized
dependent data.

Pam 4 Hour Surge/Inundation Distribution
Orleans Parish, Louisiana

Figure 3.2 Pam 4 Hour Inundation Classes
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3.3.1 Weighted Average Elevation
Weighted average elevation, field name WGTAVGELEV, was constructed in the
Geoprocessing tools in ArcGIS. Elevation values are from LIDAR DEM, which have a cell
size of 5 meters, but the size of an average blockgroup is much larger, so the elevation had
Table 3.2 Surge Inundation
Water depth
No inundation
0.5 - 0.9 ft
1 - 1.9 ft
2 - 2.9 ft
3 ft and above

Surge Score
0
1
2
3
4

to be generalized to characterize the blockgroup with one value. Elevation per blockgroup
was determined by finding the weighted average via a bilinear method after resampling the
cell size to 100 meters. In order to see elevation values in the attribute table, the values
cannot exceed 1024 bytes, so they were rounded to whole numbers. The resampled cell
was made into a fishnet grid to intersect with the blockgroups, and then converted to a
shapefile. The centroid extension was run on the shapefile, assigned an ID (through a
temporary spatial join) and joined to the fishnet shapefile based on the ID field, and then
converted to a 3d shapefile on the 100 meter grid surface elevations (z values). The reason
for such a large grid is that ArcView crashed on a 50 meter grid when converting the
centroids to a 3d shapefile. A 3dto2d Avenue script was used to bring the z values back to
a plane dimension as 3dto2d shapefile. Another spatial join was used to get the ‘elevation’
field to the 3dto2d shapefile from the fishnet shapefile, and to remove the blank attributes
from cells that originally had no elevation data. The fishnet shapefile was intersected with
the 3dto2d shapefile. The area of the blockgroups were calculated with the Calcacre script.
The fishnet shapefile was intersected with the blockgroup, and Calcarcre was used to recalculate the fishnet squares within the blockgroups. Those smaller fishnet squares were
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Figure 3.3 Pam85 Inundation Distributions
multiplied by the elevation of that fishnet square (fish*Elev). The intersected shapefile was
dissolved by the ‘fish*Elev by Sum.’

The blockgroup area was recalculated for the

dissolved shapefile. Fish*Elev sum was divided by that area to get a weighted average
field. This method proved to be more accurate than just placing an arbitrary centroid on the
large blockgroup polygon.
While elevation is an important indicator of where the water collects within the city,
storm surge is more accurate in showing which low areas will be the first to flood and
where the deepest water will accumulate inside the storm surge zone. The weighted
average elevation is subtracted from the storm surge shapefiles to get the depth of the
water. The very reason that elevation values are used in lieu of floodplain maps is that
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some areas behind the levee are not considered to be in a flood zone because the levee is
the sole provider of protection against water.
Table 3.3 Weighted Average Elevation Natural Breaks
Minimum: -6.676 -- -3.157
Excessive
6.676
Maximum:
-3.156 - -0.624
Moderate/Excessive
15.730
Mean:
.866
-0.623 - 2.226
Moderate
Std Dev: 3.590 2.227 - 6.227
Minimal/Moderate
6.228 - 15.730
Minimal

5
4
3
2
1

3.4 Find the New Probability of a Hurricane to Strike Within 150 Miles of New
Orleans Compared to Old Probability
As stated in Cutter et al.'s Handbook for finding the frequency of occurrence, the
hurricane paths are selected and verified that they are complete according to a collection of
different sources of hurricanes affecting the Gulf (NOAA's historical hurricane table, Army
Corps of Engineer reports, and UNYSIS). A 150-mile buffer is placed around Orleans
Parish (hurricanes average about 150 miles in diameter), and intense storms, Category 3
and above, are counted if they fall within that buffer and are then divided by the number of
recorded years to give the probability.

By adding Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the

probability increased by 1.3%! This significant increase brings the probability to 17.5%
each year for a major hurricane coming within 150 miles of New Orleans. The probability
constant will be added to the storm surge mean inundation to find the physical vulnerability
score. This fact alone is enough to drive proper hazard mitigation promptly. The results
are in Table 3.4 below.
Table 3.4 Probability of Hurricane Striking Distance of Orleans Parish
Hazard
Number of Events*
Hazard Frequency %
(Storm Category)
chance/year
Category 3 and
higher hurricanes
w/in 150m of

Rita (3) 2005
Katrina(4) 2005
Ivan (4)2004

17.5% per year
* Before, Katrina and Rita,
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(continued)

Hazard

Number of Events*
(Storm Category)

Hazard Frequency %
chance/year

the probability was 16.2%, an
Andrew 1992*!^(3)
increase of 1.3% in one year!
Elena 1985*!^(3) MS, AL, FL
Fredrick 1979*!^ (3)Mobile, AL
Eloise(3) 1975*
Carmen 1974(4)* ! ^
Camille (5)1969*!
Betsy (4)1965*!
Hilda(4) 1964*! LA
St Mary/Terrebone
1947(4)!^ LA, MS, AL, FL
1934(1)*!^ Central LA
1926(4)*! !MS, AL, FL & LA
1916(3)*! MS, AL
1916(3)~
1915(4)~*! New Orleans, LA
1909(3)~*! (Grand Isle, LA)
1906(3)~*! MS, AL
1893(4)~LA Plaquemine Parish
1888(3)~
1882(3)~
1879(3) W. New Orleans, LA
1860(3)~LA Jefferson/Lafourche
1856(4)~LA Vermilion Parish
1855(3) Plaquemine Parish, LA
1850 (3)~MS Gulfport, Biloxi
*154 Years in Record (1851-2005)
Sources
* Major Hurricanes To Enter The Gulf Coast (1900 – 2002) noaa.gov
! Most intense mainland United States hurricanes 1900-2000 noaa.gov
^ Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-1995
~http://weather.unisys.com/hurricane/atlantic/1906/

Orleans Parish
(complete)
27 Total

3.5 Find the Total Physical Risk
Once the surge/inundation scores are quantified, they are added to the probability
score to get the physical risk.
Table 3.5 Sample data table setup
Blockgroup

Mean
Pam4Hour
Inundation/
Pam85%

Category 3 or
higher
Hurricane
Probability
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Physical
Score
(continued)

220710001001
220710001002
220710001003

Strength
Inundation
0
3
2

.175
.175
.175

.175
3.175
2.175

3.6 Social Indicators
The next indicators listed are the social indicators portion of the study from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s 2000 Summary File 3 data. The social rates are calculated by dividing the
respective indicator (like households without a vehicle) by the respective universe’s
inundation interval.
3.6.1 Households Earning Less Than $25,000/household
The percentage of households earning less than $25,000 is from the 2000 Census
SF3 files. The ratio represents the number of households earning less than $25,000 divided
by the total number of occupied housing units in Orleans Parish.
Table 3.6 Households Earning Less Than $25,000 Natural Breaks
0 – 23%
Minimal
1
24 - 40%
Minimal/Moderate 2
41 – 57%
Moderate
3
58 – 73%
Moderate/Excessie 4
74 - 96%
Excessive
5
Source: 2000 Census SF3 File P052
The reason that households earning less than $25,000 was chosen for the income threshold
instead of households living at or below poverty was that it is next to impossible to get a
loan from a bank in order to buy a home and have a mortgage even when the household is
earning $25,000 per year. I visited Belinda, a loan officer at Campus Federal, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, and identified the rate of debt-to-mortgage is 41%, so that only leaves
$896.00 per month available for all debts (including car, credit cards, etc).
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3.6.2 No Vehicle
The percentage of housing units without a vehicle describes the percentage of
households that do not have a car, truck, or van within each blockgroup. The sample asked
this transportation question were age 15 years old and over, and is listed in file H044 and
P035 of the sf3 2000 Census. The ratio describes the number of households1 without a
vehicle divided by the total number of occupied housing units. Hazus, Beggs, seem to
agree that this an important criteria in assessing the vulnerable population in Orleans.
Table 3.7 Housing Units1 Without a Vehicle (Natural Breaks)
0 – 16%
Minimal
17 - 31%
Minimal/Moderate
32 – 47%
Moderate
48 – 65%
Moderate/Excessive
66 - 91%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File H044
1

A housing unit is a house, an apartment, a mobile home, a group of rooms, or a single
room that is occupied (or if vacant, is intended for occupancy) as separate living quarters.
Separate living quarters are those in which the occupants live and eat separately from any
other persons in the building and which have direct access from the outside of the building
or through a common hall (US Census State & County Quickfacts, 2000).
3.6.3 Non-white
The percentage of non-white persons was extracted from SF3 P006003 file. Pulido
(2000); Peacock, (2000); Morrow (1999); Stanford and Bolin (1991) have all noted that a
non-white race is usually located in the highest hazard areas. Most of the non-white
consists of African-Americans, so empirical evidence does not represent the small Asian
and Latino population present in Orleans. African-Americans were less likely to have
evacuated for Hurricane Georges (Howell, 2005). The Evacuation Behavior Study also
found that black citizens were less likely to retreat to a safer place than white citizens
(Ibid).
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Table 3.8 Nonwhite-Natural breaks
0 – 1%
Minimal
2 - 3%
Minimal/Moderate
4 – 6%
Moderate
7 – 13%
Moderate/Excessive
14 - 36% Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P044
3.6.4 Elderly
The percentage of elderly is from the TIGER SF1 file. The elderly people are a
particularly high vulnerable population because of their physical, mental, and sensory skills
naturally becoming weaker with age. Individuals over sixty-five stated in Orleans Parish
Citizen Hurricane Evacuation Behavior Study that they were less likely to have evacuated
for Hurricane Georges (Howell, 2005). Older people were also less likely to have a definite
plan for evacuation (Ibid). The very old and very young are the most vulnerable to not
move in an evacuation, due to mobility, major dependence on relatives, more prone to
respiratory distress, and a lower resilience after the disaster (Mileti (1999); Cutter et al.,
(2000); O’Brien and Mileti (1992), Hewitt (1997). FEMA also prioritizes the elderly
population as number two on their socioeconomic vulnerability list.
Table 3.9 Population Over 65 Years of Age Natural Breaks
0 – 7%
Minimal
8 - 12%
Minimal/Moderae
13 – 19%
Moderate
20 – 28%
Moderate/Excessive
29 - 45%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census SF1 TIGER File
3.6.5 Elderly with Disability
The percentage of people over 65 with a disability is illustrating people over 65 with
a sensory, physical, mental, self-care, or go-outside-home disability. The ratio represents
the number of individuals age 65 or older with a disability divided by the total population.
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FEMA prioritizes the elderly as their second most vulnerable population, and disabilities as
their third vulnerable socioeconomic indicator. Disabilities are defined as a long-lasting
condition of six months or more. The succeeding two disabilities were asked of the
population:

the existence of a) “blindness, deafness, or a severe vision or hearing

impairment” was asked for the sensory disability b) “conditions that substantially limit one
or more basic physical activities, such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or
carrying” was asked for the physical disability (Census 2000). Burby (1998), Cutter (1997,
2003), characterize the disable as vulnerable populations (Rodriguez et al., 2004).
Table 3.10 Persons Over 65 with a Disability
0 – 7%
Minimal
8 - 15%
Minimal/Moderate
16 – 24%
Moderate
25 – 38%
Moderate/Excessive
39 - 59%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P041
3.6.6 Disabled
The percentage of people over five (5) years with a disability describes disabilities
of noninstitutionalized individuals over age five (5) minus employment disabilities.
Employment disabilities were substantially higher, so excluding those makes disabilities
reflect only the sensory, physical, mental, self-care, or go-outside-home disabilities. The
universe for a percentage ratio comes from the noninstitutionalized civilian population over
the age of five (5), SF3 file P042001.

Note that this indicator is the assessment of

individuals, unlike the other indicators, which use households as the measurement.
Table 3.11 People with Disabilities Natural Breaks
0 – 19%
Minimal
20 - 31% Minimal/Moderate
32 – 44% Moderate
45 – 61% Moderate/Excessive
62 - 96% Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P041
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3.6.7 Age 16-64 Disabled (Employment Disabilities Subtracted)
Percentage of people age 16-64 with a disability includes sensory, physical, mental,
self-care, or go-outside-home disabilities. Employment disability was excluded because a
person would still be able to evacuate even with an employment disability. The universe
for a percentage ratio comes from the noninstitutionalized civilian population over the age
of five (5), SF3 file P042001.
Table 3.12 People Age 16-64 with a Disability Natural Breaks
0 – 9%
Minimal
10 - 17% Minimal/Moderate
18 – 26% Moderate
27 – 37% Moderate/Excessive
38 - 65% Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P041
3.6.8 Age 5-15 Disabled
The percentage of people age 5-15 with a disability includes children with sensory,
physical, mental, or self-care disabilities. The universe for a percentage ratio comes from
the noninstitutionalized civilian population over the age of five (5), SF3 file P042001. This
is because the mental disabilities are not added in for file P042 for the age class of 5-15.
Table 3.13 People Age 5-15 With a Disability Natural Breaks
0 – 1%
Minimal
2 - 3%
Minimal/Moderate
4 – 6%
Moderate
7 – 13%
Moderate/Excessive
14 - 36%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P041
3.6.9 Over 25 with No High School Diploma
People over age 25 without a high school diploma is from Census file P037. Lower
education has been proven to constrain the understanding of warning Information (Heinz
Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, 2000). The public education in New
Orleans has now officially failed, and was recently turned over to the State of Louisiana.
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Colinear variances will be observed for the individuals without a diploma as compared to
income less than $25,000 if they exist.
Table 3.14 Over age 25 with No High school Diploma
0 – 3%
Minimal
4- 8%
Minimal/Moderate
9 – 14%
Moderate
15 – 21%
Moderate/Excessive
22 - 29%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P037
3.6.10 Rented Housing
The percentage of rented housing units was extracted from SF3 file H007003. The
ratio represents the number of rented occupied households divided by the total number of
households. Renters are vulnerable because of their lack of finances and/or their transient
nature (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000; Morrow 1999).
Table 3.15 Rented Housing Natural Breaks
0 – 18%
Minimal
19 - 40%
Minimal/Moderate
41 – 58%
Moderate
59 – 77%
Moderate/Excessive
78 - 100%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census SF3 File H007

1
2
3
4
5

3.6.11 No Phone
The percentage of housing units without a phone originates from the Census 2000
SF3 files. The ratio represents all households without a phone divided by the total occupied
housing units. Telephones are an important means to communication to notify of an
immediate evacuation.

Calls can be made from emergency managers to inform of

evacuation and locate those who are willing to answer the phone and respond with key
punches that they do not have means to evacuate. Although phone calling as a means of
communication has not yet been documented as a warning tool, Beggs believes access to a
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phone is an important vulnerability criterion. Burby, gives an example of home phones that
ring automatically when flood waters begin to rise rapidly in Cooperating With Nature as
an evacuation warning (1998).
Table 3.16 Housing Units without a Telephone Natural Breaks
0 – 3%
Minimal
4- 8%
Minimal/Moderate
9 – 14%
Moderate
15 – 21%
Moderate/Excessive
22 - 29%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File H043
3.6.12 Lived in Same House 35+ Years
The percentage of households that moved in year 1969 or earlier is from Census file
H038. The longer a household stays in the home, and especially if they are struck and
spared, then the psychological factor of dissonance theory, which states that beliefs follow
behavior, predicts that those persons living in the hazard zone and already been exposed to
a hazard seem to think that any hazard is trivial (Burby, 1998). Ignoring and discounting
hazards, typical of the predispositioned belief, households that moved in 1969 or earlier are
based on the same beliefs as those that have not moved in 35 years or more experiencing
dissonance theory from ‘hearing’ of no damage.
Table 3.17 Homeowners That Moved in 1968 or Earlier
0 – 3%
Minimal
4- 8%
Minimal/Moderate
9 – 14%
Moderate
15 – 21%
Moderate/Excessive
22 - 29%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File H038
3.6.13 Children with Single Working Parents
The percentage of kids with single parents is from Census file P046. Mothers or
fathers that are working and have children are less likely to leave so that they can stay and
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work to provide steady income for the household.

In some instances, the household is

totally funded by the single parent. Surprisingly, the researchers have not given this
indicator is much merit as it deserves.
Table 3.18 Children with Single Working Parents
Minimum:
Maximum:
Mean:
Std Dev:

.0
.29
.05
.06

0 – 3%
Minimal
4- 8%
Minimal/Moderate
9 – 14%
Moderate
15 – 21%
Moderate/Excessive
22 - 29%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File P046

3.6.14 Large Households (4+)
The percentage of households with more than 4 people field name HH4 is from
Census file H044. The size and structure of the household have an effect on family
evacuation decisions. Households larger than four persons involve the use of more than
one vehicle, and those without a vehicle can only depend on the number of seats available
in another vehicle. Chances of the family breaking up in the evacuation process are highly
likely, as over 2,000 people are still missing from Hurricane Katrina. Value, quality, and
density (HAZUS, H. John Heinz III Center (2000), Cutter et al. (2000), Bolin and Stanford
(1991) Blaikie et al. (1987), Morrow (1999), and Puente (1999).
Table 3.19 Large Households Natural Breaks
0 – 3%
Minimal
4- 8%
Minimal/Moderate
9 – 14%
Moderate
15 – 21%
Moderate/Excessive
22 - 29%
Excessive
Source: 2000 Census Sf3 File H044
3.7 Categorizing Social Variables by Zone
The social rates for the vulnerability index are calculated by dividing the
socioeconomic respective indicator (like households without a vehicle) by the respective
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Universe Denominator value (like total households). [The universe denominators are listed
under each variable’s description].

These tables will be used in the regression and

classification analysis.
Table 3.20 Rating Social Variables
Blockgroups

# of No
car/blkgrp

# of No
households

220710001001
220710001002
220710001003

64
56
45

411
434
367

Rate: %
of No
car/HH
.342
.326
.160

Score= rate/max
rate
.342/.436
.326/.436
.160/.436

3.8 T-test and Anova1 of Physical and Social Risk
Using the Independent-Samples T Test procedure (SPSS, version 12) compares
means of the 11 socioeconomic variables used for two groups of cases. In this study the
groups represent flood and nonflood.
Next, a one-way analysis of variance is performed using MatLab version 7.0 to the
socioeconomic variables to detect any differences of means between the different surge
inundation zones. The code is listed in Appendix A.
3.9 Classification Tree Analysis
Two classification tree analyses were completed (one for each storm surge
inundation zone) by using R, (www.r-project.org) (R, Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
2005). Classification trees use a hierachical tree diagram to make decisions prediciting
common variables in the surge zones. The classification tree predicts which indicators of
social vulnerability best describe the areas of flooding as they compare with nonflooded
areas. The “cut points,” or the variable’s rate that separates it from one zone to another is
found and used for the vulnerability spatial orientation. The cut points will be queried into
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the GIS for each significant socioeconomic variable on a conditional basis. For example
find blockgroups which have more than 80% nonwhite, more than 48% no vehicle, and
more than 49% disabled. The risk level in the blockgroups from the vulnerability index
will be compared to the risk level in the blockgroups from the conditional queries for any
variances.
3.10 Find the Social Risk
The social rate for the vulnerability index is calculated by simply dividing the
socioeconomic indicator by the respective socioeconomic Universe Denominator total.
This determines the percent level of the parish in each blockgroup. To make the score
relative to the other variables, the percentages for each variable are divided by the
maximum percentage of that variable. The largest value will be 1, the smallest will equal
the minimum value divided by the maximum value. Those fractions will be added together
for each variable to get the cumulative social vulnerability factor.
Table 3.24 Composite Social Vulnerability
Disable
TreeScore
(Score=
rate/disable
max rate)

Income Tree
Etc… Social
Vulnerability
Score
(Score=
Score
(sum of all
rate/income max
indicators)
rate)

220710001001 .078

.094

.08

.xxx

1.329

220710001002 .073

.108

.124

.xxx

1.381

Blockgroups

No Car
Tree
Score
(Score=
rate/no car
max rate)

3.11 Composite Vulnerability
In determining the vulnerability, a composite vulnerability score was found by
multiplying the social vulnerability score by the physical vulnerability score (hurricane
magnitude+low elevations+probabilityconstant for each storm suge model). The overlaying of
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the high physically and socially vulnerable areas over the surge zones in a GIS will
illustrate where the most socioeconomic vulnerable to those areas that would flood first and
the most severe according to ADCIRC models and historical data from Betsy and low
elevations. 'How many residents (their age, race, income, and if they have a car, etc) will
be living in fast-flooding zones?' will be answered.
This chapter has presented an overview of the methods I will use in the analysis and
an explanation of the data I compiled to answer the research questions introduced in chapter
1. The next chapter presents the results of my analyses.
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Chapter 4. Analysis and Results
4.1 Overview
This paper explores three methods which are compared with each other to identify
the vulnerable blockgroups in Orleans Parish. In the first method, all of the socioeconomic
variables’ variance are analyzed with each storm surge model to find which ones play a part
in increasing from nonflood to flood zones, and a separate analysis of socioeconomic
variance is performed on the inundation categories as well. The second analysis utilizes a
classification tree, which is a more exploratory analysis to see how much of a role the
significant variables play. The classification tree does this by illustrating the variables, and
their respective cut points, or thresholds. The variable’s cut points are queried into the GIS
to find which blockgroups are at high risk. The third method is an index consisting of the
socioeconomic variables multiplied by the surge categories and hurricane probability.
The classification tree shows that of the socioeconomic variables analyzed, the
nonwhite variables seem to be the dominant separator from flood to nonflood areas.
Variables significantly different from nonflood and flood zones are nonwhite, earning less
than $25,000, no highschool diploma, no vehicle, no phone, children with single parents,
homeowners living in their home since before 1970, and the disabled.
4.2 T Tests
The T Test analysis compares the means of the 11 socioeconomic variables used for
two groups of cases, flood and nonflood for both storm surges. The variables and their
respective means illustrate the mean difference between flooded and nonflooded
blockgroups.

The means in nine variables were significantly higher in the flooded

blockgroups for the Pam4hr surge model which suggests that there is a socioeconomic
difference between the flood and nonflood zones. Means in ten variables were significantly
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higher in the flooded blockgroups for the the Pam85 surge model. As shown in Table 4.1,
for Pam4-hour storm surge, the number of nonwhite blockgroup mean had the largest mean
difference (+.20) from nonflooded to flooded blockgroups; children with single parents
blockgroup mean had the second largest mean difference of +.14; households earning less
than $25,000 blockgroup mean had a mean difference of +.10; households not having a
vehicle blockgroup mean difference was +.07; disabled minus employment disabilities
blockgroup mean difference was +.05; and people over age 25 without a highschool
diploma blockgroup mean difference was +.02.
The Pam85 storm surge shows that the number of nonwhite blockgroup mean was
Table 4.1 T Test Pam4hr Storm Surge Scenario

Nonwhite
Children w/single parents
HH income > $25K
No vehicle
Disabled minus
employment
No Diploma
No phone
Renters
HH over 4 people
Moved before 1970
Elderly

Pam4hr
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood

# of
occurences
368
117
368
117
368
117
368
117

Mean
.6411
.8426
.5232
.6644
.4582
.5521
.2763
.3413

Std.
Deviation
.35462
.22445
.28624
.23778
.21145
.18132
.20490
.17929

368

.3389

.16230

117
368
117
368
117
368
117
368
117
368
117
368
117

.3791
.0565
.0713
.0479
.0577
.5153
.5375
.1089
.1207
.1212
.1320
.1276
.1256

.15372
.04705
.04840
.05875
.05674
.25324
.21149
.08425
.06735
.09745
.08757
.06158
.04997
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P Value
.000
.000
.000
.002
.018
.003
.112
.347
.168
.288
.719

the largest difference at (+.27); blockgroups with children with single parents had the
second largest mean difference of +.13; households earning less than $25,000 blockgroup
mean had a difference of +.09; households not having a vehicle blockgroup mean
difference was +.06; disabled minus employment disabilities blockgroup mean difference
was +.07; blockgroups with homeowners having not moved since 1969 mean difference
was +.03; and household without a phone, no high school diploma, and rented households
had a blockgroup mean difference of +.01.
Also, Table 4.3 shows that every significant variable is highly correlated with each
.
Table 4.2 T Test Pam85 Storm Surge Scenario
Pam85
Nonwhite
Nonflood
Flood
Children w/ single parents
Nonflood
Flood
HH income less than $25K
Nonflood
Flood
Disabled (minus employment Nonflood
disabilities)

# of
occurences
322
163
322
163
322
163

Mean
.5993
.8685
.5131
.6447
.4493
.5431

Std.
Deviation
.35204
.22187
.29811
.22219
.21186
.18668

322

.3283

.16161

P value
.000
.000
.000

.000
No vehicle
Moved before 1970
HH over 4 people
HH w/out a phone
No HS diploma
Elderly
Renters

Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood
Nonflood
Flood

163
322
163
322
163
322
163
322
163
322
163
322
163
322
163
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.3888
.2716
.3321
.1141
.1431
.1034
.1282
.0466
.0574
.0537
.0726
.1301
.1212
.5157
.5305

.15257
.20672
.18256
.08636
.10831
.08594
.06601
.05970
.05513
.04916
.04223
.06178
.05258
.25076
.22987

.001
.001
.001
.055
.000
.097
.528

other.

This means that it is next to impossible to use a regression model to show any

significant changes in the data
Table 4.3 Socioeconomic Variable Correlations

Disabled

No Diploma

Earn < $25K

No Vehicle

Nonwhite

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Disabled

No
Diploma

Earn <
$25K

No
Vehicle

Nonwhite

1

.353(**)

.534(**)

.503(**)

.469(**)

.
483

.000
483

.000
483

.000
483

.000
483

.353(**)

1

.553(**)

.521(**)

.541(**)

.000
483

.
483

.000
483

.000
483

.000
483

.534(**)

.553(**)

1

.851(**)

.643(**)

.000
483

.000
483

.
483

.000
483

.000
483

.503(**)

.521(**)

.851(**)

1

.545(**)

.000
483

.000
483

.000
483

.
483

.000
483

.469(**)

.541(**)

.643(**)

.545(**)

1

.000
483

.000
483

.000
483

.000
483

.
483

4.3 One-way Analysis of Variance
A one-way analysis of variance is performed to the socioeconomic variables to
detect any differences of means between the different surge inundation zones using MatLab
Version 7. One-way analysis of variance is similar to T Tests, only it compares more than
two categories.

As can be seen in the following charts, the X axis describes the

socioeconomic variable’s log variance; the Y axis is the level of surge inundation, from 0
(nonflooding) to 4 (over 3 feet of water). The F value shows the ratio of the sum of squares
(SS) to the degrees of freedom (df) SS/df. The F value increases if there is a significant
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difference in one of the zones. As F increases, the p-value decreases. P-values less than
.05 are deemed significant. If the variable has an elongated spread, the standard deviation
is large, meaning there will be overlapping values with the other inundation zones. Many
of the graphs have the highest mean in zones 2 and 3 (1.0-2.9 feet of water).

The

relationship is nonlinear for many of the variables, which means there is inconsistency as
the water goes from nonflood to over 3 feet of water. The Pam85 surge represents a larger
vulnerable population as a whole. The mean percentages from Pam85 are larger than
Pam4hr for each zone, and more variables are significantly different from the nonflood
zone.

Figure 4.1 Households Earning Less Than $25K
The means between the two surges range from 25-75% of households in the
blockgroups earn less than $25,000 per year. Pam4hr surge holds a nonsignificant change
from 51% mean in the nonflood zone with scattered, but constant means being represented
in all of the zones. Pam85 surge, representing a larger poor population than Pam4hr, shows
that zones 2 and 3 are significantly different from the nonflood zone mean of 46% (p-value
<0). Note that both models show the highest means in zone 2 and 3.
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Figure 4.2 Disabled Elderly
The means between the two surges range from 0-25% of people in the blockgroups
that are disabled and over age 65. Pam4hr surge holds a nonsignificant change from 15%
mean in the nonflood zone with constant means being represented in zones 0-3, and a
slightly lower mean of disabled elderly in zone 4. Pam85 surge shows a nonsignificant
change in the mean from the 13% mean in the nonflood zone.

Figure 4.3 Disabled Adults
The means between the two surges range from 10-35% of people in the blockgroups
that are disabled adults. Pam4hr surge shows a significant change from 20% mean in the
nonflood zone to a 27% mean in zone 3 (p-value <0). Pam85 surge shows that zone 2 is
significantly different from the nonflood zone mean of 17%.
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Figure 4.4 Disabled Children
The means between the two surges range from 0-5% of people in the blockgroups
that are disabled children. Pam4hr surge holds a nonsignificant change from 2% mean in
the nonflood zone with scattered, but constant means being represented in all of the zones.
Pam85 surge shows that zones 1-4 are not significantly different from the nonflood zone
mean of 1%.

Figure 4.5 Children Living with Single Parents
The means between the two surges range from 35-80% of children in the
blockgroups live with single parents. Pam4hr surge holds a nonsignificant change from
60% mean in the nonflood zone with lower means in zones 1 and 2, and higher means in
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zones 3 and 4. Pam85 surge shows that zones 2 and 3 are significantly different from the
nonflood zone mean of 51% (p-value <0).

Figure 4.6 Homeowner Residence Stay 35 Years
The means between the two surges range from 5-30% of homeowners in the
blockgroups have lived in their residence for 35 years or more. Pam4hr surge holds a
nonsignificant change from 13% mean in the nonflood zone with higher means being
represented in the flooded zones. Pam85 surge shows that only zone 4 (over 3ft) is
significantly different from the nonflood zone mean of 12% (p-value <0). Note that both
models show the highest means in zone 4.

Figure 4.7 Over Age 25 without a High School Diploma
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The means between the two surges range from 1-10% of individuals over age 25 in
the blockgroups without a high school diploma. Pam4hr surge holds a nonsignificant
change from 6.5% mean in the nonflood zone with scattered, but constant means being
represented in all of the zones. Pam85 surge shows that zone 4 is significantly different
from the nonflood zone mean of 5.4% (p-value <0). Note that both models relatively show
the same means excluding zone 2.

Figure 4.8 Nonwhite Population
The means between the two surges range from 50-100% of individuals in the
blockgroups that are not Caucasian. Pam4hr surge shows that zone 2 is significantly less
from the 82% mean (p-value <0) in the nonflood zone with scattered, but constant means
being represented in all of the zones. Pam85 surge, representing a larger poor population
than Pam4hr surge, shows that zones 2 and 3 are significantly different from the nonflood
zone mean of 46% (p-value <0). Note that both models show the highest means in zone 2
and 3.
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Figure 4.9 Households without a Phone
The means between the two surges range from 0-14% of households in the
blockgroups that do not have a phone. Neither surge shows that any zones are significantly
different from the 4-5% mean in the nonflood zone. Both Pam4hr and Pam85 surges have
scattered, but constant means being represented in all of the zones. Pam4hr surge has a
gradual increase as the zones ascend. Pam85 surge shows the highest mean in zone 2, and
as the zones ascend, the mean decreases.

Figure 4.10 Households without a Vehicle
The means between the two surges range from 10-50% of households in the
blockgroups that do not have a vehicle. Pam4hr surge shows zones 3 and 4 having the
highest means, but they are not significantly different from the nonflood mean of 25%.
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Pam85 surge shows that zones 2 and 3 are significantly different from the nonflood zone
mean of 27% (p-value <0). Note that the means for both surges are relatively the same
except for zone 2-- 19% in Pam4hr, and 42% in Pam85.

Figure 4.11 Elderly Population
The means between the two surges range from 4-20% of individuals in the
blockgroups that are over age 65. Pam4hr surge shows constant means being represented
in all of the zones. Pam85 surge shows that zone 4 is significantly different from the
nonflood zone mean of 12% (p-value <0). Note that the mean for zone 4 in Pam85 is
nearly doubled the mean in Pam4hr zone 4.

Figure 4.12 Renters
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The means between the two surges range from 20-75% of households in the
blockgroups that are renters. Pam4hr surge shows constant means being represented in all
of the zones, with higher means in zones 3 and 4. Pam85 surge, representing a larger renter
population than Pam4hr surge, shows that zone 2 is significantly different from the
nonflood zone mean of 51% (p-value <0). Note the mean for Pam4hr zone 2 of 32%
compared to Pam85 zone 2 mean of 66%.

Figure 4.13 Disabled
The means between the two surges range from 20-55% of individuals in the
blockgroups that disabled minus employment disabilities. Pam4hr surge shows constant
means being represented in all of the zones, with a higher mean in zone 3. Pam85 surge
shows that zones 2 and 4 are significantly different from the nonflood zone mean of 33%
(p-value <0).

Figure 4.14 Households with More Than Four People
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The means between the two surges range from 6-22% of households in the
blockgroups that have more than four people. Pam4hr surge shows constant means being
represented in all of the zones, with a higher mean in zone 4. Pam85 surge shows that zone
4 is significantly different from the nonflood zone mean of 10.5% (p-value <0).
4.4 Classification Tree Analysis
The classification tree predicts membership of cases or objects in the classes of a
categorical dependent variable from their measurements on one or more predictor variables.
The goal of using classification tree analysis is to predict or explain the socioeconomic
indicators chosen based on whether the blockgroup is in a flood or nonflood zone. A
theoretical example of classification analysis is like dropping coins in a slot which are
sorted into different slots based on their size. The tree will separate the data in the best way
by finding binary splits on variables at the best splitting point at each stage. The process
usually stops when 5 nodes are reached.

Next, the tree is snipped by using

misclassification error.
Classification tress analysis is also used in data mining, which is an analytical
process that searches for consistent patterns in or between business or market-related
variables, and then applies the findings to validate the new subsets of data. The method
will be used in this context to ask which socioeconomic variables predict whether there is
flooding or nonflooding. And second, what is the difference in the variance/significance of
each variable as it relates to the criterion/grouping variable. An advantage of classification
trees is that they can handle muticolinearity between the variables.
In the outputs below, each condition splits a predictor using < or > that gives the
most significant increase in correct classification of the observed blockgroups. If the
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branch splits above, the condition is read as true (for example, if nonwhite>.47, then it
terminates at N) and if the branch splits below, the condition is read using the inverse of the
sign (a greater than sign [<]). The condition arrives at a leaf (terminal node), which
contains the classified value for that response; N representing a nonflood zone, and F
representing a flood zone.
When examining how the Pam 4 hour tree formed, the nonwhite population was the
first predictor variable to split at 0.47. The nonwhite variable has the lowest deviance,
meaning the minimized node impurity is best at the nonwhite variable. Node impurity is
the probability to be picked in group N when really in group F. The calculation that
minimizes node impurity, Σ p^mk (1-p^mk), is performed for each variable. The large split
between the nonwhite variable and the other variables cannot be interpreted exactly as it
looks. The algorithm used in classification trees is greedy, meaning that if the nonwhite
variable were not included in the tree, another variable could have just as large of a split as
the nonwhite variable does in the model used.
The nonwhite, no vehicle, renters, children with single parents, large households,
the elderly, the disabled, and homeowners living in the homes since 1969 were the
variables used for the tree. Fifteen percent of the blockgroups were misclassified. The
conditions were then queried with the GIS to see which blockgroups were matched. Fiftysix blockgroups out of 116 total flooded blockgroups (48%) successfully queried the flood
zone using the conditions from the classification tree.

Figure 4.2 shows the queried

blockgroups in blue outlines; the red blockgroups are in the Pam4hr flood zone. Twentytwo blockgroups, or 19%, that matched the conditions were not in the flood zone. The
blockgroups misclassified were higher than the 14% value which R software stated.
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Figure 4.2 Pam4hr Classification queries versus Pam4hr Flood Zone
When examining how the Pam85 tree formed, the nonwhite population was the first
predictor variable to split at 0.81. The nonwhite variable has the lowest deviance, meaning
the minimized node impurity is best at the nonwhite variable. The nonwhite, no vehicle,
renters, and the disabled were the variables used for the tree. The R software showed
twenty-seven percent of the blockgroups being misclassified. The conditions were then
queried with the GIS to see which blockgroups were matched.

One hundred ten

blockgroups out of 163 flooded blockgroups, or 67% successfully queried the flooded areas
using the conditions from the classification tree. Figure 4.2 shows the queried blockgroups
in blue outlines; the red blockgroups are in the Pam85 flood zone. The queries showed that
80 blockgroups, or about 49% were classified as being in a flood zone that were not. The R
software stated a lower than actual misclassification rate of 27%.
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conditions

nodes

branches

Figure 4.3 Pam4hr Classification Tree

4.5 How Does the Vulnerability Index Match With the Scenario Surge Zones and the
Classification Tree Queries?
When multiplying the physical risk by the social risk, the mean risk was 4.69.

The

maximum risk was 32.53; the minimum risk was 0. Standard deviation was 6.15. See Figure 4.6.
As stated in Chapter 2, this analysis follows Cutter’s, Handbook For Conducting A GIS-Based
Hazards Assessment At The County Level (1997).
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Figure 4.4 Pam85 Classification queries versus Pam85 Flood Zone

The blockgroup count for low risk is 333 out of 485, or 69% of the blockgroups in Orleans
Parish are at low physical and social risk. One hundred twenty of the blockgroups, or 25%
are at moderate physical and social risk. Thirty blockgroups, or 6% are at high physical
and social risk. See Figure 4.7 for a map view and Table 4.5 for the individual and
household Breakdown of Risk.

The reason for such vulnerable areas having a high

physical and social vulnerability is not by accident. Decades after the Civil War was over,
deed covenants limited housing choices by African Americans to physically and socially
poor environmental settings (Colten 2005). Although every blockgroup (100%) in the
medium/high risk range is actually in the combined surge zone, some of the blockgroups in
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the surge zone had a low risk value and therefore were not classified as medium/high risk.
See Figure 4.8.

Figure 4.5 Pam85 Classification Tree
One hundred forty-eight out of one hundred fifty-two blockgroups (97%) in the
medium/high risk range are of the combined Pam4hr and Pam85 classification tree queries,
but again, there are many blockgroups not included that were queried with the classification
tree. See Figure 4.9.
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Chapter 5. Discussion
5.1 Pre and Post-Katrina Intentions of Study
What is the point of this analysis? The city has vacated. This research is more
focused on the method rather than the current situation.

The original intentions were to

promote local evacuation policy, but since Hurricane Katrina, this research method could
help explore evacuation policies on a national scale. New Orleans pre-Katrina socioeconomic make-up was unique to metropolitan coastal cities (Census 2000 SF3 data).
Since most populations in metropolitan cities near the coast have a higher median income
than New Orleans, and all the variables are correlated with income, finding an income
threshold could be different for each city. Census 2000 estimates the median household
income was $31,445 for Mobile, $28,895 Galveston; $36,616 Houston; $27,133 New
Orleans; Biloxi, $34,106 (see Table 5.1).

Figure 4.6 Statistics
In order for other studies to use the indicators that were used in this study,
correlations between vulnerability indicators should be made prior to the most vulnerable
are selected. The relationship between depth and/or income and other socio-economic
variables should be considered if weighting the variables for a vulnerability query.
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5.2 Sources of Data and Analyses and How They Are Used to Characterize the
Geographic/Social Vulnerability to Hurricanes
Traditionally, statistics that have been performed on spatial locations have not been
able to illustrate the results very clearly to decision-makers because of a lack of
visualization (a map). The outputs would consist of a table of some form, without ever
being able to tangibly visualize the results. Geographic Information Systems have enabled
the statistician and other analysts to easily see the results of their methods in graphical

Figure 4.7 Risk Distribution
Table 4.5 Individual and Household Breakdown of Risk
Blockgroups
Individuals
Occupied
Households
Low risk
321,234
130,504
Moderate risk
137,391
48,000
High risk
22,019
8,092
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Households Without
a Car
33,749
14,268
3,226

Figure 4.8 Moderate/High Risk vs. Combined Surge Inundation

Figure 4.9
Risk vs. Classification Tree Query
Chapter
5. Moderate/High
Discussion
Table 5.1. Median Household Income
New Orleans
Galveston
Lake Charles

Median Household Income
$27,133
$28,895
$30,774
(continued)
71

Mobile
Beaumont
Biloxi
Houston

$31,445
$32,559
$34,106
$36,616

form. The purpose of this paper is to identify a baseline measurement of hazards and the
associated vulnerable populations in Orleans Parish.

The goal of this research is to

enhance the emerging field of GIS-based vulnerability assessment research to be used by
local decision makers to assess the location of those least likely to evacuate for a hurricane.
Without the GIS, the classification tree conditions could not have been queried for
accuracy, which would greatly limit validation of the classification tree. The classification
tree did a fair job (Pam4hr: 78%; Pam85 82%) at separating the flooded from the
nonflooded areas based on the socioeconomic characteristics. Even though classification
trees do not discriminate against colinearity, the intercorrelated variables had to have some
part in the misclassification. Another cause of error could be attributed to the binominal
dependent: flood or nonflood. Each condition has a 50% chance of being in one or the
other.
The T test comparisons seemed to be the best indicator of a somewhat lower
socioeconomic makeup in the surge regions.

Variables significantly different from

nonflood and flood zones are nonwhite people, households earning less than $25,000, no
highschool diploma, households without a vehicle, households without a phone, children
with single parents, homeowners living in their home since before 1970, and the disabled.
The one-way comparisons of variance show a unique nonlinear situation between
many of the variables when compared with the zones of inundation. It seemed that the
highest rate of the variables landed in the higher zones and the lowest rate fell in the
nonflood zone primarily.

Theories for the nonlinear correlation are that the most
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socioeconomically-enabled seem to be either taking no risk, or the highest risk. This indepth look at how the socioeconomic variables compared to the levels of inundation
exposed that there is a range of socioeconomic status living within the flood zone.
High correlations between the variables proved to be inadequate to use regression
analysis. Using weighted average elevation as the dependent variable was the only model
that fit the data sufficiently, while still on the low side of the threshold.
The risk index did the best job at comparing physical and social risk for the
blockgroups. Every blockgroup (100%) in the medium/high risk range fell into the surge
zone, but some of the blockgroups in the surge zone had a low risk value and therefore
were not classified as medium/high risk.
Although each variable was weighted equally, future indices could weight some
variables more than others. The regression was intended to do this, but a good fit model
was lacking.
5.3 What Role Can Public Policy Have To Instill More Disaster Resilient
Communities In Our Nation?
The complexity of studying unique events to prepare for all hazards is therefore a
daunting task. With there being many aspects of evacuation to study, the roles that public
policy currenlty partakes in, and potential roles for public policy that have proven to be
indispensible is therefore discussed.
A policy should be promulgated to incorporate all pertinent sectors in this great
hazard-demographics study to a national hazard web map by evaluating and indexing the
risks based on such a concept like presented in this thesis as the National Risk Value
(NRV) as information becomes more available [I coined this concept]. The government’s
role is to facilitate the preparation of an evacuation plan, and to exercise that plan for
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immediate actions to consider. The plan has to be drilled so that more of the community
stakeholders can regularly practice preparing for an event amidst the constantly changing
climate and demography.

How can we better prepare for an evacuation that has an

extensive duration, leaving 200,000 to 250,000 housing units devastated along the Gulf
Coast (Louisiana Recovery Authority Report, 2006)? Having a more specific number of
people and homes that are at risk presents more evidence to support more effective
decision-making. The National Risk Value could act as the rapid generator of detailed
results.
Emergency crises tend to change paradigms faster than everyday policy creation.
Just since Katrina and Rita have happened, the question of ‘how can we get the people to
evacuate?’ has changed to ‘what are we going to do with people when they evacuate?’
Tierney stated that Raid, Norris, and Ruback (1999) found that the single strongest factor in
predicting household evacuations were those that had been involved in previous
evacuations (2001).
5.3.1Government Organization
The dire need of a cohesive federal, state, and local government has been deeply
exposed after the Katrina/Rita hurricanes.

Mileti eluded in 1999 that “better local

management and decision making are now more critical than most future advances in
technology.” Government organization has only deteriorated more since those words
were recorded as the fragmentation of disaster/crisis responsibilities at each level of
government has increased (too many agencies governing the same entity); status of
emergency management agencies (especially at the national level) is ill; and weak
political constituencies are advocating improved emergency management, while severely
constrained budgets are increasing and the authority of those budgets is decreasing
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(Sylves, 1991: 423). NOAA has many evacuation technical reports available on the
success and failures of past evacuations (http://www.csc.noaa.gov/hes/hes.html).

Why

weren’t the past evacuation handbooks on NOAA's website read and followed for Katrina
and Rita? The “federal and state trend is to cut risk and assume liability, which has
overlooked and undermined local government responsibility for using land-use
management techniques to reduce exposure to hazards” (Mileti, 1999). All levels of
government can use the findings of the most vulnerable blockgroups within a region to
facilitate in search and rescue, as well as future development of that region.

5.4 Is The Methodology For Identifying Vulnerable Residents Helpful
(Financially and Logistically) to Decision Makers?
Mandates such as the Uniform Building Code, and incentives such as the Hazard
Mitigation Planning Funds are designed to mitigate communities for future disasters. The
physical/social model developed in this thesis is user-friendly enough that emergency
managers could use the information to make decisions regarding hazard safety.
5.5 What Options Does the Public Possess to Drive Policy in the “Safe” Direction?
Citizens can make a difference in coordinating and facilitating evacuation of their
neighborhoods. Mileti states that “inequality of wealth also makes many people more
vulnerable to hazards and less able to recover from them” (1999). The results of this study
should at least serve as a starting point for discussions in a community-based preparedness
and mitigation planning initiative that also incorporates an understanding of the social,
political, and economic setting of a community. Research has shown that recovery is most
effective

when

community-based

organizations

assume

principal

responsibility,

supplemented by outside technical and financial assistance. (Mileti, 1999). If residents had
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access to the results that I found, they could be more adamant to network with their
blockgroup and make proactive preparations for the next hurricane threat.
5.5.1Role of Economic Forces
Citizens drive the economy whether they intend to or not. Lichtenburg (1994) states
that balancing costs and benefits should be more of the focus than guaranteeing safety.
There is no “safe” place to live in the United States today, so to think realistically where the
most severe threats are and prioritize them for comparison purposes is the most logical way
to mitigate in the future.

As in the case of Orleans parish, flood plain

mitigation/management involves both land and water resources that have multiple
competing uses, including navigation, recreation, commercial fishing, drinking water,
wildlife habitat, waste disposal, industry, commerce, human habitation, agriculture, and
wildlife habitat. Public input is needed to steer the region in the most economically and
environmentally stable direction.
5.5.2Cultural Ideas and Beliefs
Distinctive Louisiana society characteristics reflect approaches used to manage
hazards and disasters. There is a huge public protest of not being able to rebuild back in the
devastated areas that are prone to repetitive flooding. Louisiana has historically been a
poor state in economic terms, but rich in culture and biodiversity. The unevenness of
wealth in this state makes it a unique problem when deciding where to rebuild. The bottom
line is that the government is not going to keep financing risky development, so the people
(especially the poor) do not have that choice of culture over risk.
5.6 Data and Spatial Uncertainties and Limitations
Uncertainties that have arisen as a result of the data and analysis include the age of
the data: it is almost six years old; the unusually large proportion of low-income people are
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within a hurricane surge zone; and the colinearity that exists between variables that could
be hidden. If other variables also cause the dependent then any covariance they share with
the given independent variable in a correlation may be falsely attributed to that
independent.
People living alone expressed as a percentage is an example of colinearity existing
between the variables. The known fact that a higher number of people are living alone is
another factor that adds to one’s vulnerability (Kleinberg, 2000). The death toll of the
Chicago heat wave in 1995, as well as the death toll of Hurricane Katrina was the result of
distinct dangers in the cities’ social environment: an increased population of isolated
seniors who live and die alone (Kleinberg, 2000). For the first time in our history, the
number of people living alone has surpassed the number of people living with others. Not
everyone is going to have a neighbor who will check up on him/her, especially in a very
fast-onset flood, like after the levees broke in New Orleans, 2005 (NPR, Sept 30, 2005).
The variable is encompassed in the elderly or disability categories; it cannot be an
independent variable because of its high colinearity with income, elderly, and disabled.
Census data is the best source of data for a large area; if the data could be renewed
every five years instead of every decade, researchers could determine more precise
findings. Also, the data at the blockgroup level is only a sample of one (1) out of every six
(6) households—it is only an interpretation of the area. Many people living in coastal areas
are either retired or professionals. But, New Orleans makes up a unique social fabric
because of the fact that the city has been undisturbed by hurricanes since 1965 before
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. If the methodology presented here were used in other coastal
parishes, income may not need to be weighted as heavily.
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Census data could attempt to include the number of tourists and homeless from the
region’s local Chamber of Commerce or Economic Development Office. A study of
tourists and hazard perception, response intentions, and personal characteristics that may
affect their response were answered in face-to-face interviews taken at tourist destinations
in Mississippi (Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, 2002). The interviewers
seemed to believe that if the respondent only had one more day left in his/her vacation, then
a hurricane warning could mitigate the visitor's reluctance to evacuate (Ibid). I would think
the exact opposite: if there was only one vacation day left, then leaving early would prove
less of a hassle in the long run. One third of the people surveyed said they had not
considered what they would do in the event of a hurricane threat (Ibid). A startling fact that
UNO Hospitality Research Center gathered is that 96% of visitors perceive New Orleans to
be a safe destination (2005).
An estimated 10.1 million visitors came to Metropolitan New Orleans (Orleans
Parish, Jefferson Parish, St. Bernard Parish, St. Charles Parish, St. Tammany Parish, St.
John the Baptist Parish, and Plaquemine Parish) in 2004 (UNO Hospitality Research
Center).

Friday is the most popular arrival day; Sunday is the most frequent departure

day. Hurricane Katrina occurred early Sunday morning. Louis Armstrong International
had 312,698 passengers flying into New Orleans in September 2004 (number was down
9.8% from the previous year). Fifty-one point three percent (51.3%) of tourists fly, 44.2%
drive, and 4.5% use some other form of transportation. After figuring the number of
tourists that fly, tourist numbers of drivers and other modes of transportation are
interpolated as 609,547 tourists.
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Table 5.2 Tourist Interpolation
Mode of Transport
51.3% fly

Tourists
312,698 (from flymsy.com)

44.2% drive
269,420 (interpolated)
4.5% some other 27,429 (interpolated)
form
of
transportation

Rate
(down 9.8% from
previous year)
N/A
N/A

The transient and homeless population behavior was surveyed during five disasters,
including hurricanes and earthquakes. Approximately 75 percent of the tourists and the
business people responded to warnings by evacuating to a safer place, while only 58
percent of the homeless people evacuated (Drabek, 1996). A study by the Leonard Davis
Institute of Health Economics suggested that 2.77% of the population in Philadelphia and
2.21% in New York were using the public shelter system (Culhane et al., 1994). I can
interpolate that to equal 2.45%, (the mean of Philly and New York) of the total population
or 11,875 homeless persons in New Orleans. The rate of hotels per blockgroup was used as
the multiplier for the constant value of 11,875 to get the distribution of homeless. The
homeless were positioned relative to the tourists, as they depend on tourists for money,
food, and personal items.
5.7 Technology and Professionalization Trend Impact
Who is providing the technology to measure the hazards and whom they affect?
Private consultants, universities, and non-governmental organizations are. Schulz (1993)
argues that these centers, and universities more generally, should expand their efforts to
include training and education of local officials and other groups that ordinarily do not seek
out hazard mitigation information but who are central to policy change. Universities could
also do more, as noted by Schulz (1993) and other investigators (e.g., Ender and Kim et al,
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1988; Havlick and Dorsey, 1993), to intertwine design professionals’ role more in land use
strategies to reduce losses from hazards (Burby, 1998). The Heinz Panel made a great list
of recommendations for think-tanks to follow:










Who

FEMA, NEMA, Institute for Business and Home Safety, American Red
Cross, and the Institute for Business and Home Safety collectively
coordinate disaster cost data collection, reporting, and accessibility via
World Wide Web through previous networking prior to the disaster
striking (Heinz, xxvi).
Report expenditures should reflect the hidden costs of business, social, and
natural resources categories state earlier. Reports should be in a standard
layout to integrate with one another. Geographic locations, projections,
spatial scales, temporal scales, etc (Heinz, xxvi).
Databases should be expanded to include ALL costs as defined earlier to
include location, type of loss, cause of loss, and actual or estimated dollar
loss in all four categories (Heinz, xxvi).
Make the report expenditure procedure available for communities to
follow if they decide to implement a loss reporting task force (Heinz,
xxvii).
Have a standard updating procedure for new information on costs over the
long-term. Updated critical facility, demographics, economic indicators.
Have sector-specific post-disaster teams for businesses and employment,
housing, human resources, and health and environment following a
disaster. (see NC Disaster Recovery Task force on Fran) (Heinz, xxvi).
“Identify federal, state, and local policies that directly or indirectly
promote growth and development that increase the vulnerability of
communities to coastal disasters” (Heinz, xxvii).
‘Natural hazard vulnerability and mitigation needs’ should be included in
those policies identified to fostering growth and development in the
coastal communities (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000).
will take the lead in Louisiana? Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)

programs;

universities,

economic

development,

and

engineering/emergency

management/ urban planning consulting firms.
5.8 Recommendations
Communities can collectively begin to prepare (in different timescales) for shortterm and long-term mitigation for the hazards that lie in their area.

The short-term

objectives include (1) adopting International Building Codes and other passive-living
techniques which enable residents to survive in their homes without power and water lines
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for longer periods of time; (2) a system which rings home phones automatically to sound an
alarm that a disaster is nearing; (3) disaster experts weighting worst-case losses more than
they currently do (levee durability was to stand in a 200-year storm; Netherlands levee
systems stands for a 10,000-year storm); (4) education of citizens through schools and jobs
of the acknowledgment of (a) the lack of perception of probability of loss, (b) the false
assumption that some have of the event never reoccurring, (c) the dissonance theory, (d)
fatalistic thinking; as well as (e) what to prepare to bring when evacuating; (5) laws
requiring real estate agents to inform their clients of hazards when selling property and
structures; (6) low resolution NRV (National Risk Value) hazard maps available to the
public (especially renters) by diverse dissemination pathways (internet, mail, newspaper,
flyers); The education exercises could be too technical for the ordinary citizen, but simple
cartoon strips could do the job. Long-term objectives include (1) Improved probability
estimates as factors such as global warming and changing landscapes are influenced (2)
higher resolution hazard maps; and (3) the encouragement with market-based incentives for
building physical capital and infrastructure in hazard free zones. When a disaster does
occur, and relocation is the only option for whatever reason, the evacuees will migrate
towards naturally safer areas over time. Service industry jobs, such as tourism, internetbased businesses, and outdoor recreation should dominate the hazard zoned areas, while
manufacturing and agriculture, and other brick-and-mortar headquarters should occupy the
evacuee zoned areas.
Although we can say that all these recommendations can drive impacts, is there any
evidence of that? Very little research exists on the ways in which governmental structure
and policies influence preparedness and response activities, and most of that work has been
done only in the U.S. The few non-U.S. and crossnational studies that exist do little more
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than suggest what those impacts might be. Some work explores the impact centralization
of government functions, as opposed to decentralization, has on the handling of disaster
situations (Tierney, 2001).

Often, “political ideologies and patterns of institutional

dominance” prevail even when the danger is so severe that people are witnessed dying on
the streets of New Orleans (Katrina response).
Standards have to be identified primarily in the counties’/parishes’ hazard
mitigation plans promulgated under the Stafford Act. The plans could then undergo a final
draft prior to the importation to the model which derives the National Risk Value [coined
by myself]. The National Risk Value is a hierarchical holographic model (HHM) which
recognizes that multiple conceptual (or mathematical) models are necessary when working
with effects to the economical, social, governmental, and natural environments (Burgman,
2005). Haimes (1981, 2001) describes HHMs as capturing the intuition and perspectives
embodied in different conceptual and mathematical models of the same system (Burgman,
2005). The final value for each county/parish could arrive from a rank which describes the
likelihood of a disaster, (very high, high, medium, low, very low) to affect their region, and
then the degree of confidence in the plausibility of the hazard (a value between 0 and 1)
(Burgman, 2005). The NRV could eventually lead to a finer resolution such as at the block
level, or even a parcel-by-parcel basis. The National Risk Value (NRV) could provide the
groundwork for obtaining higher resolution State Risk Values in the future once the NRV is
monitored for a while to adjust for accuracy and cost effectiveness.
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Chapter 6. Importance of Mitigation and Problems Achieving It
6.1 Overview
After identifying the most vulnerable populations residing in a vulnerability zone,
strategizing of how to prioritize and plan for warnings and assistance for the sheer number
of people can be daunting. As described in Chapter 1, New Orleanians have to evacuate
because there is vulnerable infrastructure (sound levees, drainage pumps, shelters) to
maintain their safety during and immediately after a hurricane or tropical storm. The
current strategy, evacuation, can have both positive and negative outcomes, as described in
the next section. A comparative analysis of public evacuation information and policies
available to the public from different regions is cited in Chapter 7 in order to provide a
greater understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of evacuating large numbers of
people. Evacuation is the only short-term mitigation in some places which are too
vulnerable to live in, like New Orleans.
6.2 Recent Global and Local History of Evacuations
Weather-related coastal hazards’ association with a greater loss of life has been seen
both in the United States and globally since the mid to late 1990s (H. John Heinze III
Center, 2000). Mass evacuations have taken place around the world for natural disasters,
technological disasters, and geopolitical unrests. A brief history of evacuations is examined
to illustrate the success and failures resulting from immediate actions taken in order to save
lives during a crisis. In 1998, 300,000 people were evacuated in preparation for a possible
breech of the dikes along the Yangtze River in China. Nearly 14 million people had
previously been evacuated for the massive flooding, and 5.6 million houses were destroyed
(Abramotivz, 1998). Hurricane Georges (1998) prompted mandatory evacuation in the
Florida Keys of 80,000 people, and then in low-lying areas of Miami, which amounted to
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another 100,000 evacuating (Howell, 2005). Georges was predicted to make landfall in
New Orleans, so evacuations were urged in Louisiana, resulting in almost half of the 1.3
million people evacuating from the metro area (Ibid). Evacuations were called for in
coastal Mississippi and Alabama counties as well. During the evacuation, I-10 closed to
avoid late evacuees from being stranded on the highway. Louisiana, Mississippi and
Alabama reported similar traffic difficulties such as delays due to construction along
evacuation routes, lack of capacity on evacuation routes, heavy traffic congestion and flash
flooding on major evacuation routes (Post et al., 1992).
Hurricane Floyd (1999) prompted public officials to launch one of the largest
evacuations in U.S. History, forcing 2.7 million people to evacuate; mandatory and
voluntary evacuations were issued in almost every state from Florida to New York (PBS&J,
2000). The massive uncertainty of where the storm would make landfall left evacuees tied
up in more traffic.
Ric Williamson, commission chairman of the Texas Department of Transportation
stated that over 3 million Texans evacuated for Hurricane Rita in less than 48 hours in an
Immediate Release Bulletin (2005). After the September 11th terrorist attacks and the
anthrax mailings that followed shortly after, evacuation resulted in yet of another purpose:
weapons of mass destruction. The latest evacuation has sent more than 1,000 residents
from Massachusetts and Rhode Island from their flooded homes after tremendous rain in
the area (Levenson and Daley, 2005).
6.3 Socioeconomic Barriers
David A. McEntire and Christopher Fuller in The need for a holistic theoretical
approach: an examination from the El Nino disasters in Peru listed developed a list of
factors which played a role in an unsuccessful evacuation for El Nino (2002). Amazingly,
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the factors are all a function of little or no planning or mitigation, as well as being all longterm fallacies related to the relationships between the social, natural, political, and physical
environments. These long-term failures equate to risk factors for the affected population in
the event of both a fast disaster onset, as well as a slow disaster onset such as the energy
crisis or a drought. New Orleans experiences many of these factors already.
What factors play a role in not so successful evacuation?
1. Inappropriate location of settlements
2. Rapid and unplanned urbanization
3. Improper construction of homes
4. Insufficient or ineffective structural mitigation devices
5. Deforestation
6. Failure to implement traditional coping mechanisms
7. Constraining cultural attitudes
8. Poverty
9. Limited preparation
10. Impact of technology and hazardous materials
11. Inadequate health care
12. A centralized response
Figure 6.1 What Factors Play A Role In A Not So Successful Evacuation?
Each devastation has as many differences as it does similarities. Usually, the lower
income classes suffer the most due to their inability to absorb the losses, while the losses
from which they suffer could be one of many hazards (flooding, coastal surge, erosion,
tornadoes, levee breaches) that primarily and secondarily affect them (Mileti, 1999). The
complexity of studying unique events to prepare for all hazards is therefore a daunting task,
but there are a general set of social and physical indicators which can serve as an analysis.
6.4 Evacuation Stresses to Society and Government
The primary impact of evacuation is temporary displacement. Secondary factors
include lost work time, equating to loss of funds, family structure under stress, kids missing
school, and medical supplies to patients disrupted. Increased property loss, relief costs,
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suspended business operations, loss of family and neighbor networks, and ecosystem
disruptions all increase as coastal communities grow (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000). It
seems to be a paradox that the federal government grants millions of dollars to states and
local governments to build more resilient communities, but the states and local authorities
have yet to address where that ‘safe’ place stands. For example, the National Food
Insurance Program was initiated to help mitigate properties located in the floodplain with
either flood insurance, or raising the buildings, but state and local laws do not require that
the landowner buy the insurance or raise the building located in the low-lying area
generated from the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FEMA National Flood Insurance Policy,
2005b).
When one thinks of evacuation, it is usually, ‘grab the important documents,
photos, and other small memorables, fill up an ice chest or two with food and drinks, get
the pets and kids in the car and go’! But where do you go? Maybe to a friend’s or
relatives’ home for a few days. What if it means staying for weeks? Then what? Is it the
government’s responsibility to take care of us then since they are the ones who did not plan
better for these sorts of events with our taxpayer dollars? It is the government’s fault that
so many New Orleanians are homeless (technological failure from faulty levee design and
construction)? In Mississippi, Texas, New England, and elsewhere, the governments are
far more innocent to blame for prevention and preparedness of the actual event. Only their
planning for the social, economical, and built environments, as well as the response-mode,
or lack there of, is scrutinized instead. The Katrina/Rita disasters revealed a wide range of
technological weaknesses that exist in our society.
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6.5 Transportation Logistics
There are only three routes out of Southeast Louisiana: I-10 East; I-10 West; and
the Causeway to the north. All roads out traverse water, and are surprisingly low in
elevation (raw LIDAR elevation points). I-10 East has an extremely low point which
frequently floods due to heavy rainfall. After winds begin gathering speed up to 20 hours
before landfall, crossing bridges becomes more dangerous--the state police closed major
bridges on the Saturday afternoon before Katrina hit at around 7 am on Sunday (Governor
Blanco Testimony, 2006). The Louis Armstrong International Airport's last flight out was
around the same time as the bridges closed (Ibid), which in retrospect could have saved
many more lives if a private-public partnership had been established for evacuating the
City.
A cause for some people to not evacuate is due to poor information or lack of
information concerning the hazard. After the Louisiana State Police used GIS to construct
a map of the evacuation routes out of the dangerous area and dispersed them throughout the
region, the evacuation proved to be drastically more effective for Katrina’s evacuation than
for Ivan’s evacuation just one year earlier.
6.6 Psychological Barriers As A Result of Underestimated Vulnerability
Empirical studies are focusing on the causes of the prominent negligence of lay
people's understanding of the consequences of risk admonished by experts (Krimsky,
1992).

For example, why do people continue to build and live in floodplains while

witnessing disastrous flooding throughout the United States and paying high flood
insurance premiums, on top of a considerable amount of federal money that has been spent
on defining flood zones? Risk perceptions correspond with statistical frequencies of death,
along with qualitative aspects such as dread and a catastrophic potential (Slovic, 1979).
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There is currently a societal understanding of risk underway aiming at informing policy
makers about the social dimensions of risk (Krimsky, 1992). Plapp states several factors
which influence risk perception: the risk's characteristics, worldviews or values,
psycometric paradigms, ethnic-cultural and socioeconomic background, and personal
variables such as profession (2001). Krimsky (1992), Plapp (2001), and Lai and Tao
(2003), note two prominent theories for a cause of this refusal to follow experts’ advice:
(1) cognitive limitations, and (2) cultural limitations.

Sjoberg (2000) believes risk

perception is based on a hybrid of the previous two reasons for denying risk. I believe
many of the cognitive limitations are partially based on cultural limitations, therefore, I
describe risk perception limitations as being grouped together.
Examples of cognitive and cultural limitations include: anxiety, dissonance theory,
predispositioned belief, heuristics bias, dependence on government, and fatalist bias. The
cognitive limitations can be influenced by culture, age, race, gender, economic class, and
education level (Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Plapp (2001), Lai and Tao (2003), and
Flynn et al. (1994).
Uncertainty generates anxiety.

To reduce the anxiety, the person denies the

uncertainty by being overconfident that they are safe from the risk (Slovic, 1979). Ignoring
and discounting hazards tends to be a psychological difficulty in risk perception. The
longer a household stays in the home, and especially if they are struck and spared, then the
psychological factor of dissonance theory, when believing follows behavior, predicts that
those persons living in the hazard zone and have already been exposed to a hazard seem to
think that any hazard is trivial (Burby, 1998). Others have predispositioned belief, an
innate feeling of safety from their home, no matter how long they have been there. “Some
flood victims interviewed by Kates (Borsh, 1968) flatly denied that floods could ever recur
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in their areas (Borsh, 1968).” This can be exemplified in the survey from The Survey
Research Center (SRC) at the University of New Orleans.

Taken in June 2004, the

primary reason found for not evacuating is that the person believes their home is safe.
Sixty-two (62%) percent of respondents believe they would be safe in their home during a
Category 3 storm. The surveyors’ belief that one is safe in their home in a Category 3
storm is the single best predictor of actual evacuation behavior.
Mounting evidence in L. Ross' study “The Intuitive Psychologist and His
Shortcomings,” suggests that people’s beliefs change slowly and are extraordinarily
persistent in the face of contrary evidence (Berkowitz, 1977). On the other hand, some
people’s perception of the hazard as being all encompassing is to the point that they don’t
think they can prevent them regardless of where they live [fatalistic belief] (Burby, 1998).
Interpretation of different subsequent information after a belief has already formed
does not have as much weight in changing the predispositioned belief {as much as what?}.
It will be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative (Slovic, 1979). Therefore,
hard evidence is not the most persuasive form of influencing the risks to the public.
Weaker information is likely to be interpreted to coalesce with the predispositioned belief
(Slovic, 1979). Some thought, incorrectly, that new dams and reservoirs in the area would
contain all potential floods, while others attributed previous floods to freak combinations of
circumstances, unlikely to recur.

People make different heuristic assumptions about

hurricanes based on experience or second-hand experience (a relative, friend, or TV
visualization). Prior experience in hurricanes, such as relatives and friends reminiscing of
surviving through Hurricanes Betsy and Camille, lead to biases for future hurricanes, such
as Hurricane Katrina. Lichtenberg (1997), shares the belief among many economists and
mitigation planners alike that both individuals’ and some communities’ believe that the
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government will pick up the damage tab, so they are not willing to plan for reducing their
vulnerability of their life and property, even when the steps are feasible and cost effective.
It behooves the federal government to stop subsidizing inadequate structural protection to
avoid high costs in the future. Residents have depended on the Army Corps of Engineers
and other experts to protect them, but the experts themselves have overlooked or misjudged
the levee’s pathway to potential disaster and its false sense of security for urban
development (Slovic, 1979). The building of levees and other control-structures is similar
to building larger highways: the total number of deaths will still increase because the
number of miles has increased (Slovic, 1979).
For hurricane risk to be influenced to the residents, they need to be able to imagine
the disastrous effects, or remember a time when a hurricane disaster affected them in a
frightening way (Slovic, 1979). This is why animations and news reports of the destruction
are so important. The 3D simulation I want to create exercises subjective judgments to
hazard mitigation of the evacuation of residents. Race (Savage, 1993, Flynn et al., 1994)
and gender (Lai and Tao, 2003) have been proven to correlate higher with particular
cognitive limitations for risk perception as described above.
6.7 Influx of Population to Coastal Areas Increases Risk
More than half of the United States population lives within 50 miles of the total
88,000 miles of coastline (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000) because of the human appellate
for commerce, food, climate, and aesthetic purposes. “Nationally, employment growth was
nearly three times the population growth nearest the shore” (National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, 2005). “Almost half of the national economy came from the
coastal watershed counties” (Ibid). As population migration toward the shores of the ocean
and estuaries increases, so do the amount of coastal storms and increased erosion.
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Although population growth has been constant over the last three decades, the pressure of
the growth is coming from an increasing density of the population within a fixed land area
(Ibid). “At over 230 persons per square mile, the population density of the near shore is
three times that of the nation as a whole” {The near shore area is defined as shore-adjacent
zip codes}(Ibid).
Cutter et al., (2000), Burton, Kates, and White (1993), Blaikie et al. (1987), Peacock
et al., 2000), Hewitt (1997), and Platt (1999), and FEMA all consider the growingly dense
population an important indicator of vulnerability. More development and inhabitants
equates to more complex evacuations, and an increase in the loss of lives from coastal
disaster in the near future (H. John Heinz III Center, 2000). The recent evacuation of
Houston for Hurricane Rita proved unsuccessful as contraflow, the poor, and special needs
victims had not been addressed in advanced planning, and gasoline shortages plagued the
area (McChesney, 2005). The shortages were caused by gas stations and filling tank plants
closing early (Thursday before Rita hit on Saturday morning) and evacuating themselves
(Ibid). In addition, there was gridlock on the highways which prevented getting more
tanker trucks to stations, and stalled cars blocked lanes, lines at filling stations along
highways blocked exit ramps, and people abandoned there (this is “their” but I would omit
it) cars and walked to shelters (Ibid). No reserve supplies on highways existed (Ibid). The
mayor of Houston said there was a State plan which stated that the Department of
Transportation would provide for deployment of fuel, and the mayor was told by the DOT
that the task had been completed task by 6 am on Thursday (Ibid).

91

Chapter 7 Disaster Management Laws and Policy
7.1 Federal Impetus: Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
As FEMA begins to turn more focus towards hazard mitigation, the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000)
was amended to foster united mitigation planning, coordinating, and implementing between
states, tribes, and jurisdictions (42 USC § 5121 et seq.). The Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000 requires counties/parishes/tribes, and/or jurisdictions to develop a hazard mitigation
plan in order to receive federal disaster mitigation dollars for building safer communities
(P.L. 106-390, § 104(a),114 Stat. 1558). The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act encourage “the development of comprehensive disaster
preparedness and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and organizations by the States
and by local governments.”

It also achieves “greater coordination and responsiveness of

disaster preparedness and relief programs” (Pub. L. 93-288, title I, § 101, May 22, 1974, 88
Stat. 143; Nov. 23, 1988, Pub. L. 100-707, title I, § 103(a), 102 Stat. 4689.) States that
meet the enhanced planning criteria get increases of 15% to 20% of the Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program funds (HMGP) under Sec. 322 (FEMA State and Local Mitigation Planning
how-to guide, 2002). Every county is required to submit a Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan to
be approved by FEMA. Coastal counties have a greater obligation to submit the Mitigation
Plan since three-fourths of federally declared disasters in the U.S. occurred in coastal states
or territories, with flooding being the number one cause. Surprisingly, only two parishes,
St. Mary (11-01-04) and St. Tammany (3-30-2-05), and one jurisdiction, City of Monroe's
(4-13-05) Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan were approved by FEMA in Louisiana (FEMA,
Approved Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plans, 2005a).
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Under Sec. 203: Mulit-Hazard Advisory Maps, “a national web-based mapping
server at FEMA will have the ability to access hazard data from external sources and to
present data in a standard format” (FEMA, 2003). Phase 1, completed by October 2001,
was to “establish a web-based mapping server, develop interoperability standards for
exchange of GIS hazard data between government agencies, states, local jurisdictions and
other organizations, ongoing coordination with participating federal agencies, states, and
local communities” (Ibid). The state and local participation is to have a web interface with
state mapping sites, with standardized GIS data provided by state. By June 2002, the
hazard map server was upgraded to the standardized GIS data.

When browsing to

http://www.hazardmaps.gov/atlas.php, the web infrastructure is complete with all potential
natural disasters in an easy dropdown menu under the legend. The hazard map server is
great for cursory viewing by a visitor, and appears to have engineering tools with user
access. If the hazard mapping server is not advising the state and local jurisdictions by
helping them to construct their Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan, what purpose is it serving?
7.2 Evacuation Laws in Coastal Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
States surveyed in Wolshon et al’s study of evacuations use a variety of public
awareness campaigns to keep people informed of the latest development with hurricanes
impacts in their communities (2005). Popular activities include: hurricane conferences,
hurricane awareness weeks, hurricane expositions, website information, rest area
information,

brochures,

public

service

announcements/

television

interviews,

newspapers/utility bill inserts. As jurisdictional websites have become more user-friendly
and better-equipped with the latest reports and guidelines, I chose to survey them for ease
of finding written general and special needs evacuation information. Table 7.1. describes
what county/jurisdiction’s website offers for hurricane protection of the population.
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Table 7.1 Written Evacuation Notices for Katrina/Rita affected regions
County/
Juridiction

Evacuation
Guidelines/
Map Present
on local
website?

Special
Needs
Guideline
s
Present
on local
website?

Is there a link to
the Emergency
Mgt
Office?

Does the
Emergency
Mgt Office
have
evacuation
guidelines?

Does the
Emergen
cy Mgt
Office
have
special
needs
guideline
s?

Do the County/
Jurisdications have
approved Multi
Hazard Mitigation
Plans?

City of Houston,
TX

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Harris County,
TX

No

No

No, but keyword Yes
search gets there

Yes, but
not
effective

Only unincorporated
town have been
approved

City of New
Orleans, LA

Yes

Yes, but
not
effective

Yes

Don’t know Don’t
know

No

Southeast/Southw No
est LA Plans

No

No

No

No

St. Mary & St.
Tammany

City of Biloxi,
MS

Yes

No

No, but keyword Yes
search gets there

No

Yes

City of Gulfport,
MS

No

No

No

N/A

N/A

Harrison County, Yes
MS

No

No

Yes

No

Just Biloxi and Pass
Christian

City of Mobile,
AL

Yes, with
keyword
search

No

No

No

No

Yes

Mobile County,
AL

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

If the policies pertaining to the logistics are indeed functional in the case of an
evacuation, the exodus of the population can be achieved much smoother. Although, some
municipals, parishes/counties, and state governments have yet to address all populations.
Planning for how to evacuate those most at risk is essentially the short-term mitigation
strategy for hurricane vulnerable populations.
The City of Houston has a noticeable link to its Office of Emergency Management,
which has an Evacuation Plan, as well as a Disaster Preparedness Guide when the keyword
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'evacuation' is searched (http://www.houstontx.gov/). According to the City of Houston
Evacuation Plan, Texas has no mandatory evacuation law, but after doing some research on
Harris County's Emergency Preparedness website, I found that a new state law mandating
mandatory evacuation was signed on 6/9/2005 (TX State Capitol). This change of law
should have been reflected in the City of Houston's Emergency Plan to minimize any
confusion associated with whether to call a mandatory evacuation. The City plan does state
that those who do not have a vehicle out of the city “will need assistance in evacuating and
provisions must be made to provide public transportations for these individuals.” There is a
Passenger Transportation Request form located in Appendix 2, Annex S of the Houston
Evacuation Plan (Ibid).

It also states that special facilities, “such as schools, hospitals,

nursing homes, daycares, and correctional facilities are responsible for the welfare and
safety of their clients, patients, and inmates by having an emergency evacuation plan; but
they may request the local government for assistance in transportation, and school buses,
city buses, and other emergency vehicles may provide emergency transportation with
pickup points or a telephone bank to receive and process requests for transportation” (Ibid).
Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management has a map and a
'Plan and Prepare' link which goes to the Red Cross. On the Red Cross page, a link on how
to help elderly or disabled persons lists a personal assessment page that can be printed out
to help whoever is going to assist the special needs person. The exodus of the special needs
population is not addressed.
The New Orleans Comprehensive plan currently is not available without a user ID.
The Superdome and Convention Center were witnessed to have been functioning as central
temporary evacuation sites since no “safe sheltering” is available in the City.

But,

according to the Nursing Facilities Evacuation Plan on the City of New Orleans website,
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the evacuation host facility, the transporters of the patients and supplies, as well as vendors
should have a “signed and current contract” for a response plan. The special needs shelters
evacuation plan is also visible on the cityofno.gov website, stating “a telephone number
will be issued to the public” for where to shelter. A detailed list of tasks for the Shelter
Director and other associated staff is provided, as well as a clear understanding of who is in
charge (Ibid). It is unsure if these plans were in place prior to Katrina, or if they just did
not get used to their full potential. A brief statement of what to do before the storm, how to
ride out the storm, and how to react after the storm was listed on the cityofno.gov website,
as well as a list of guidelines of what to bring, maps of where to go, what State Emergency
Alert Broadcasting System to listen to while traveling, and how long it should take to get
there in the traffic. The need for a regional evacuation has proved imminent, as the
Houston evacuation demonstrated that a city cannot successfully evacuate its citizens out of
harms way by itself. Louisiana does have a Southeast and Southwest Evacuation Plan
listed, but under the headline 'Supplements Published Separately' in the Table of Contents
of the State Emergency Operations Plan. The plans are not found under 'Plan' on the
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness website.
Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi do not have a comprehensive jurisdictional or
county evacuation plan on their city websites, nor do they address special needs victims
under the guidelines for what to do before, during, and after the storm passes. The City of
Biloxi mitigates by stating what to do before hurricane season starts, and has an evacuation
map (City of Biloxi, 2005). The City of Gulfport has no guidelines for how to prepare for a
hurricane on their website, and no links to Emergency Preparedness Offices. Harrison
County's Civil Defense Department, where Biloxi and Gulfport are located, has a dropdown menu of guidelines which state what to do and bring, but regret to include what
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special needs victims do. Evacuation maps are on the Harrison County website (2005). I
later found that Mississippi did indeed have an extensive emergency evacuation plan,
which was cited on NOAA's website.
In the Mississippi Hurricane Evacuation Study Technical Data Report, mobile-home
residents and the tourist population were the only populations deemed vulnerable (2002).
In response to the special needs populations, it states “Agencies responsible for hurricane
preparedness of special needs facilities (hospitals, nursing homes, adult homes, and
correctional facilities) should ensure that proper attention is given to the complex task of
planning and coordinating emergency response” (Ibid). The paragraph that stated this
opened with a warning acquired by a previous ill-fated attempt to protect occupants in
multi-storied buildings. This clearly eludes that the administrators of those special needs
occupants did not have the resources to evacuate the victims. It goes on to say that it is the
responsibilities of the local governments to arrange adequate transportation and care of
private residents who do not have a car, and stresses to maintain an up-to-date roster of
special needs people. Surprisingly, no one said they failed to leave because they had no
transportation, but four percent in the category 1-2 surge zone said they had no place to go
(Ibid).
The City of Mobile's website does not have a link to evacuation maps and
guidelines, but a keyword search for evacuation leads to the information. The Mobile
Country Emergency Management Agency's name is under the guidelines and maps, but no
link is available.

Mobile County's website was evaluated for hurricane preparedness

guidelines and special needs persons. There was no link to the Mobile County's Emergency
Management Agency website. No evacuation plans exist on Mobile County's Emergency
Management Agency website.
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Although the internet has made plans such as evacuation and special needs
assistance transparent to the public, some counties/jurisdictions still do not have the public
emergency documents visible. Houston made the best stab at detailing an evacuation plan
for transporting disabled, elderly, and other special needs populations. Transportation is
the most critical need when addressing special needs victims.

The other

counties/jurisdictions only have guidelines which states that a special needs victim is
welcomed at a shelter, but that they are generally on their own for assistance on getting
there and residing there. If the citizens (and some officials) do not know what plans are in
place, how can they react appropriately?
7.3 Evacuation Laws in Other States
How are other states addressing transportation and sheltering to special needs
victims? Most state emergency management agencies recognized the special needs that
low mobility groups have during hurricane evacuations. Arrangements made for special
victims in other states consists of providing special arrangements such as elderly
registration programs in counties and the use of airplanes in some hospitals to transport
some medical patients. In New York, these special arrangements vary according to local
municipal plans. In Maryland and Virginia, they are also determined individually by each
local jurisdiction. In New Jersey, arrangements for large facilities such as nursing homes,
hospitals and prisons are written into plans; while for smaller facilities and/or individuals
they are handled locally. For example, in all of the states mentioned before, buses would be
used to transport elderly people to shelters. Table 7.2 shows the list of surveyed states that
make special arrangements (i.e., use of buses) for low mobility groups as reported on
Question 23 on the survey.
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Table 7.2 Low Mobility Groups for Whom States Make Special Arrangement During
Hurricane Evacuations
State

Elderly Infirm

Prisoners Tourists Homeless Orphans Others

Maine

X

X

X

X

X

X

Massachusetts X

X

X

X

Campers

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

New
Hampshire

Rhode Island

X

Disabled

Connecticut

X

X

X

New Jersey

X

X

X

Delaware

X

X

X

X

X

X

Georgia

X

X

X

X

Florida

X

X

X

X

Mississippi

X

X

X

X

X

X

Louisiana

X

X

X

X

X

X

Texas

X

X

X

X

South
Carolina

7.4 Background of Evacuation Zones
PBS&J, the Army Corps of Engineers, and southeast Louisiana parishes delineated
evacuation zones by overlaying Census blocks, political boundaries, transportation and
water features, transportation modeling, and SLOSH surge models (Post et al., 1992) in a
GIS. By using census blocks, the vulnerable population is quantified so that transportation
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routes out of the area and shelter capacities are not overwhelmed. Larger populations have
more evacuation zones; for example, thirty-five zones were delineated in Orleans parish
(Post et al., 1992).
7.5 Evacuation Policy History and Louisiana Evacuation Policy
In 1900, despite warnings, many people did not evacuate Galveston because they
did not expect the storm to be as severe as it was; they were also given a late storm warning
(a little more than 24 hours) (Galveston and Texas History Center, 2005). Starting in the
1970s, several cities, including Dade County, Florida, conducted studies for the evacuation
of coastal residents.

During the 1980s, the field of transportation planning analysis

advanced with the development of conceptual and computer models used on studies to
estimate traffic flow analysis.
Until recently, engineers have not played a big role in the planning and management
of transportation systems for evacuation due to the then misconception that evacuations
were rare, localized, could not be made more efficient, and did not affect a significant
portion of the population (Wolshon et al., 2005).

The decision to evacuate is the last

segment in a series of events that evolve around the weather conditions, communication
between federal, state, and local governments, and preparation response actions.

In

Louisiana, the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) is responsible for
coordinating preparedness, response, and recovery for hurricanes between the parishes and
jurisdictions. The LOEP uses a five-step “activation” process that transitions their staff
from routine operations to increased stages of readiness from Level V, meaning routine
operations to Level I involving recommendations on how to evacuate (Wolshon et al.,
2005). Level II is the stage where information is disseminated to the public on how to react
to the hurricane threat through media outlets.
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This is the stage that the vulnerable

populations should be assessed and mapped out to be shown through the media outlets.
During a Level I Activation, the LOEP monitors the status of low-mobility populations
consisting of nursing homes, hospitals, and prisons. If problems arise, LOEP assists in
making arrangements to transport people out of these facilities.
Authority to order evacuations is usually called by Governors, although some orders
are delegated to local level officials due to the local delegates having a greater
understanding of the local conditions (Wolshon et al., 2005).

They also become a

politically sensitive issue if the order turns out to be falsely called.
Twenty-seven percent (27%), approximately 250,000 residents of New Orleans ~not
including tourists or “special needs” populations~ had no means of private transportation
(Wolshon et al., 2005). The total number of buses available for maximum service by the
Regional Transit Authority in Orleans and Jefferson parishes is 464. Fewer than 10% of
those needing transportation could be evacuated by means of urban bus without using the
vehicles as “shuttles to nowhere” because of the sheer number of people. Some coastal
Louisiana parishes were promoting exiting with neighbors, or church related networks just
before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ravaged through.
7.6 Evacuation Classifications and Time Constraints
Timing for when to call an evacuation is a paradox: you want to call it early so
ALL populations can find the means to get out, but early calls leave more room for the
hurricane to change course. The National Hurricane Center's forecasts contain “significant
uncertainty in the time frame of 1–3 days out,” and they have not made much improvement
in forecasting the degree of intensity (Wolshon et al., 2005). Coastal states vary in their
decision of when to call an evacuation. Louisiana mandates the longest notification time,
as was surveyed in Wolshon et al., 2005.
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Evacuations are classified as one of three types: “voluntary,” “recommended,”
and “mandatory.” Voluntary evacuations are targeted toward offshore workers and others
with long lead times. Recommended evacuations are thought of as interchangeably with
“voluntary” evacuations in some states. People are entirely more likely to respond to the
mandatory evacuation more than voluntary or recommended, but most states will not have
state and local agencies enforce the orders (Wolshon et al., 2005).
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Chapter 8. Conclusions
8.1 Summary
The industrial revolution has brought unprecedented growth to coastal regions for
humans to engage freely in the industrial, commercial, recreational, and residential
developments of their choice, yet floods are the most chronic and costly natural hazard in
the United States, causing an average of 140 fatalities and $5 billion damage each year
(Schildgen, 1999). Despite advances in flood science and implementation of Federal
hazard-reduction policies, damage from flooding continues to escalate (Pielke and
Downton, 2000). Damage from floods results from a combination of the great power of
flowing water and the concentration of people and property along rivers and coastal areas.
In the United States, about 3,800 towns and cities of more than 2,500 inhabitants are on
floodplains (Meyer and Miller, 1984). FEMA estimates that over 9 million households and
$390 billion in property are at risk from flooding (2005b).
‘Plan Nature’ will supercede human alterations of the landscape; forewarning of the
people is the most democratic way of dealing with the problem. Evacuation planning can
produce sustainable results; hurricane protection cannot equate to sustainable results in
southeastern Louisiana; no land insulation exists, and increasing energy costs coupled with
sea level rise cannot withstand the continuous building and maintaining of the levees and
wetlands.
The National Risk Value (NRV) could require the collective effort of every interest
in the United States to become successful. Learning to communicate and work together,
two simple tasks learned in preschool, has emerged as the greatest challenge facing the
nation and the world today. Until this reprioritizing paradigm takes effect, what are we
going to do with the displaced people?
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Mitigation for assisted-evacuation will be determined by how community decision
makers will use and/or adapt this information to develop mitigation and preparedness
management plans. This task requires an understanding of the social and political context
of the hazard planning process, as past studies have shown that scientific information can
play no role in hazard planning processes (Wood, 1994; Fischer and Arredondo, 1999).
Will risk aversion prevail for the long-term in coastal Louisiana? The decision to live
further away from open water and higher in elevation is worth sacrificing the beauty for
security.
Also, by using hazard mitigation, the region cannot only become more disaster
resilient, but can improve the other social, political, and environmental weaknesses as well.
Simple public education of the underlying hazards in their environment will prevent many
of the evacuation traumas that exist (where and how to build). The effort has to be
collective, with every stakeholder equally represented. Although some stakes cannot hold a
price tag (such as culture), the equal representation of delegates can compensate if the
paradigm of economics OR environments becomes economics AND environment.
8.2 Future Research
Some topics, such as household response to disaster warnings and population
protection actions generally, have been studied quite extensively, while other equally
significant ones, such as post disaster sheltering, have received little emphasis. Studies that
focus on the more micro-social units of analysis like the household are much more common
than studies at the macro-social level (Tierney, 2003).
Repeated evacuations will be an excellent way to equate what is the local tolerance
for future disasters’ impacts. Mileti defines the ‘local tolerance’ as lives lost, injuries
sustained, people left homeless, environmental damage, interrupted critical facilities and
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lifelines, transportation system damage, economic system damage (1999). A great future
research project could be to assess the ‘mitigation gap’ which occurs as the difference
between the local tolerance for disaster losses and the actual disaster losses (Mileti, 1999).
Some may find that the gap is too great to sustain a healthy economy.
This physical/social risk model created here demonstrates a template for future
hurricanes threatening the coasts. Of course, in order to keep the data current, determining
risk with the new spatial location of the forecasted storm surge and hurricane probability to
that area will be key inputs, as well as defining who is vulnerable by substituting other
current region-specific socioeconomic data. Other hazards such as chemical releases, forest
fires, earthquakes, volcanos, tsunamis, and terrorist attacks can use this same model to
determine who is at risk if definite zones can readily be identified for the hazard. Housing
stock data at the block level is a key feature in HAZUS-MH, although it has proven not to
be reliable for businesses. If state and local officials worked together (especially in the tax
assessors’ department) and produced more region-specific data, a greater understanding of
all aspects of the area would be more evident. Other aspects that need to be mapped out for
clarity include direction of future urban development patterns, residential and commercial
property assessments, placement of potential government investments, and placement of
research institutions.
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Appendix A Matlab Code for Anova1
z=z4hr25K;
k=find(pam4hr==0)
w0=z(k)
k=find(pam4hr==1)
w1=z(k)
k=find(pam4hr==2)
w2=z(k)
k=find(pam4hr==3)
w3=z(k)
k=find(pam4hr==4)
w4=z(k)
w=[w0 w1 w2 w3 w4];
[p,anovatab,stats]=anova1(w,[zeros(1,length (w0)) ones(1,length (w1)) 2*ones(1,length
(w2)) 3*ones(1,length (w3)) 4*ones(1,length (w4))]);
comparison=multcompare(stats,'alpha',0.05)
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Appendix B Pam4hr and Pam85 Classification Results and Queries
Pam4hr Surge:
Variables actually used in tree construction:
[1] "Z_NONWHT" "Z_NOVEH"
"ZRENHUN"
"ZKID1PAR" "Z_HH_4PERS"
"Z_OVER65" "Z_TOTDIS_E" "Z_MVD69ORE"
Number of terminal nodes: 18
Residual mean deviance: 0.774 = 359.9 / 465
Misclassification error rate: 0.1491 = 72 / 483
Queries in GIS:
P4hrqu1: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" < .15 AND "ZRENHUN" > .205 AND
"ZKID1PAR" < .285
P4hrqu2: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" > .15 AND "ZRENHUN" < .25 AND
"Z_HH_4PERS" < .13
P4hrqu3: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" > .15 AND "ZRENHUN" < .27 AND
"ZRENHUN" >.25
P4hrqu4: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" > .15 AND "ZRENHUN" > .27 AND
"Z_NONWHT" > .81 AND "Z_OVER65" > .07 AND "Z_TOTDIS_E" < .405 AND
"ZKID1PAR" < .715 AND "Z_MVD69ORE" < .215 AND "ZRENHUN" < .535
P4hrqu5: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" > .15 AND "ZRENHUN" > .27 AND
"Z_NONWHT" > .81 AND "Z_OVER65" > .07 AND "Z_TOTDIS_E" < .405 AND
"ZKID1PAR" > .715
P4hrqu6: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" > .15 AND "ZRENHUN" > .27 AND
"Z_NONWHT" > .81 AND "Z_OVER65" > .07 AND "Z_TOTDIS_E" > .405 AND
"ZRENHUN" > .39 AND "Z_NOVEH" < .495 AND "ZKID1PAR" < .86 AND
"Z_TOTDIS_E" >.575
P4hrqu7: "Z_NONWHT" > .47 AND "Z_NOVEH" > .15 AND "ZRENHUN" > .27 AND
"Z_NONWHT" > .81 AND "Z_OVER65" > .07 AND "Z_TOTDIS_E" > .405 AND
"ZRENHUN" > .39 AND "Z_NOVEH" < .495 AND "ZKID1PAR" > .86
Pam85 Surge:
Variables actually used in tree construction:
[1] "Z_NONWHT" "ZRENHUN" "Z_TOTDIS_E" "Z_NOVEH"
Number of terminal nodes: 9
Residual mean deviance: 0.9888 = 468.7 / 474
Misclassification error rate: 0.265 = 128 / 483
Queries:
P85qu1: "Z_NONWHT" >.815 AND "Z_NOVEH" < .475 AND "Z_NONWHT"
>.995
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P85qu2: "Z_NONWHT" >.815 AND "Z_NOVEH" <.475 AND "Z_NONWHT" <
.995 AND "Z_TOTDIS_E" < .495
P85qu3: "Z_NONWHT" >.815 AND "Z_NOVEH" <.475 AND "Z_NONWHT" < .995
AND "Z_TOTDIS_E" > .495
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Appendix C Figures by Surge Zones
Surge Zone Intervals
0
1
2
3
4
Surge Zone Intervals

0
1
2
3
4
Surge Zone Intervals

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of Occupied
Households
150,578
5096
8867
7976
14,495

Pam 85% Surge Zoned
Number of Occupied
Households
124,549
4995
13,511
13,098
30,859

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of noninstitutionalized
Number of
civilians over age 5
noninstitutionalized
civilians over age 5
352,479
285,104
11,416
11,502
21,801
31,501
19,597
32,266
34,818
79,738
Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of individuals
381,442
12,305
23,533
27,225
23,000

Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of individuals
313,141
12,758
34,056
34,839
87,181

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of TIGER
individuals

Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of
TIGER individuals
37,421
1273
4196
4132
963134056

0
1
2
3
4

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of individuals over
age 25
236,982
8007
13,496
17,070
23,000

Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of individuals
over age 25
198,628
7131
20,619
20,775
51,402

Surge Zone Intervals

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone

Pam 85% Surge Zone

0
1
2
3
4
Surge Zone Intervals
0
1
2
3
4

Surge Zone Intervals
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Number of owned homes
0
1
2
3
4

71,584
2077
2802
3582
7545

Number of owned
homes
59,422
1796
4846
5230
16,296

Surge Zone Intervals
Intervals

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of children under
18
91,397
2690
6116
5060
9488

Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of children
under 18
70,567
3731
8310
8724
23,419

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of tourists
578,707
3170
9510
18,835
0

Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of tourists
534088
6284
12562
21986
34548

Pam 4 Hour Surge Zone
Number of homeless
11275
62
186
367
0

Pam 85% Surge Zone
Number of homeless
10,402
122
244
428
672

0
1
2
3
4
Surge Zone Intervals
0
1
2
3
4
Surge Zone Intervals
0
1
2
3
4
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